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FOREWORD
Organization theory hypothesizes that an organization’s culture enables its members to work through
the basic problems of survival in, and adaptation to,
the external environment. Organizational culture also
guides the organization’s development and maintenance of internal processes and procedures that perpetuate adaptability and promote continued existence.
Consequently, organizational culture has considerable impact on an organization’s behavior at any given time, particularly on organizational effectiveness.
However, little literature and even less data discuss
the impact of organizational culture within military
organizations and, more importantly, the impact that
organizational culture may have on the development
of an organization’s leaders.
In the present study, Dr. Pierce postulates that the
ability of a professional organization to develop future
leaders in a manner that perpetuates readiness to cope
with future environmental and internal uncertainty
depends on organizational culture. Specifically, the
purpose of his study is to explore the relationship between the Army’s organizational culture and professional development. He examines the degree of congruence between the Army’s organizational culture
and the leadership and managerial skills of its officer
corps senior leaders. He uses data from a representative sample of such leaders while they were students
at the Army War College, Classes of 2003 and 2004.
At the macro level the results of his research
strongly suggest a significant lack of congruence between the U.S. Army’s organizational culture and the
results of its professional development programs for
its future strategic leaders. He bases his conclusion on
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empirical data that indicate that the future strategic
leaders of the Army believe that they operate on a
day-to-day basis in an organization whose culture is
characterized by:
• an overarching desire for stability and control,
• formal rules and policies,
• coordination and efficiency,
• goal and results oriented, and
• hard-driving competitiveness.
However, sharply highlighting a pronounced lack
of congruence between what they believe the Army’s
culture to be and what it should be (based on their
development as future strategic leaders), the respondents also indicated that the Army’s culture should be
that of a profession, which emphasizes:
• flexibility and discretion,
• participation,
• human resource development,
• innovation and creativity,
• risk-taking,
•	long-term emphasis on professional growth,
and
•	the acquisition of new professional knowledge
and skills.
Clearly, the second set of cultural values and behaviors are much better aligned with the current and
future demands of the Army’s external strategic environment. Further, almost by definition, these 533 officers represent the future leaders of the Army. That is
why their collective perceptions of the Army’s professional culture and of their own managerial and leadership skills are of such significance to the Army.
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Dr. Pierce’s research data provide empirical support to the findings of the Army Training and Leader
Development Panel (2001), which suggests that the
training and leader development programs of the
Army profession are not adequately linked and integrated within the Army culture. Dr. Pierce states
that the Army’s future strategic environment will be
ambiguous and uncertain, and organizational culture
and professionalism characterized by flexibility, discretion, and innovation offer the greatest opportunity
to maximize effectiveness in such an environment.
Consequently, his data strongly suggest that the Army’s culture is preventing the individual exercise of
the excellent professional skills that are being taught
via the Army’s formal professional development programs. He postulates that if the Army profession expects to maintain its social legitimacy and professional jurisdiction, which are focused on the development
and application of the esoteric knowledge and related
practical professional skills of land warfare, then the
Army profession must take steps to make its professional culture, and particularly the informal development program, congruent with one that is characterized by flexibility, discretion, and innovation.
Dr. Pierce recommends that the leaders of the Army
profession initiate an organizational culture change effort. Specifically, he recommends changes to the more
informal aspects of the professional development program, such as the less than lifelong commitment to the
Army profession, the “up or out” personnel policy,
and the officer evaluation system which may be creating an underlying assumption that failure will not be
tolerated regardless of the circumstances. Those conditions all are representative of “theories-in-use” that
are incongruent with the concept of professionalism.
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As a result of the current culture, senior leaders may
be exercising an excessive degree of structured supervision which reinforces the culture of stability and
control despite, the formal education system which
attempts to teach the opposite. Therefore, it is not surprising that junior professionals learn to distrust their
senior leaders and to then subsequently perpetuate
the cycle of over-control, or depart the profession altogether.
Dr. Pierce recognizes that his study results reflect
only a snapshot in time. Since this study was initially
conducted, the Army has entered an era of persistent
conflict, and is approaching its 9th year of combat.
Therefore, Dr. Pierce readily understands that a longterm longitudinal analysis may provide different results, which is exactly why the Strategic Studies Institute is sponsoring a follow-on study by Dr. Pierce and
Dr. Don Snider. The new study will create a long-term
database and evaluate the results of this 2003-2004 research along with analyzing current data to provide
a more robust analysis that may more adequately explain some of the highly subjective ideational aspects
of “the way we [the Army] do things around here”
(Bower, 1966; Triandis, 1972; Deal and Kennedy, 1982,
p. 4).

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Why is organizational culture is important? The
theory of organizational culture maintains that individual behavior within an organization is not solely
controlled by the formal regulations and structures of
authority as supported by structural theorists. Instead,
the theory postulates that cultural norms, values, beliefs, and assumptions provide unconscious guidance
and direction, and consequently, the subsequent behavior of organizational members. Accordingly, Martin et al. (1997), emphasize that studies of organizational culture share a common objective, which is “to
uncover and interpret aspects of organizational life so
that we can better understand the perceptions, beliefs,
and actions of organizational members” (p. 3). If you
want to be able to comprehend the current behavior
of an organization as well as to reasonably anticipate
its future actions, then you must be able to understand
the deep basic underlying assumptions that comprise
the abstract concept of organizational culture (Schein,
1999). A strong appreciation of an organization’s culture can help explain why organizational members
sometimes exhibit “mysterious, silly, or irrational”
behavior (Schein, 1985, p. 21).
Organizational culture can be found at every level
of an organization, and since organizational members
are multicultural entities understanding an organization’s culture is significant “because the beliefs, values,
and behavior of individuals are often understood only
in the context of people’s cultural identities” (Schein,
1999, p. 14). Consequently, the long-term strategic
decisions made by the senior leaders of an organization are influenced by their multicultural background,
but especially by the organization in which they have
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spent the bulk of their lives, such as members of professional organizations like doctors, lawyers, and
military officers.
Professional organizations exist in a competitive environment where their social jurisdiction and
legitimacy can only be supported or perpetuated as
long as they maintain their expertise over an area of
abstract knowledge that society perceives as important (Freidson, 1970, 1986; Abbott, 1988; Burk, 2002;
Snider et al., 2009; Moten, 2010). Since organizational
culture is hypothesized to have a considerable impact
on organizational behavior and because of the relative
scarcity of literature discussing the impact that organizational culture may have on the development of
professional leaders, this study attempts to examine
the congruence1 between organizational culture and
the professional leadership and managerial skills of
professional leaders. Specifically, this study examines
the U.S. Army culture and its senior leaders.
This research strongly suggests that there is a lack
of congruence between the U.S. Army professional
culture and the professional development programs
of the Army’s senior level leaders. This conclusion is
based on empirical data that indicate that the future
leaders of the Army profession believe that they operate on a day-to-day basis in a profession whose culture
is characterized by an overarching desire for stability
and control, formal rules and policies, coordination
and efficiency, goal and results oriented, and harddriving competitiveness. Emphasizing this lack of cultural congruence, the respondents of this study also
indicated that the Army’s professional culture should
be one that that is characterized by flexibility, discretion, participation, human resource development, innovation, creativity, risk-taking, and a long-term com-
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mitment to professional growth, and the acquisition
of new professional knowledge and skills,2 which is a
culture that is more aligned with the Army’s strategic
external environment.
One of the principal reasons for the popular interest in the study of organizational culture is to determine the linkage between it and organizational
performance (Berrio, 2003). This study has reviewed
a previously assumed but unverified connection between organizational culture and professional development. It has uncovered a lack of congruence between the dominant type of organizational culture of
the U.S. Army and the professional managerial/leadership skills of its senior level leaders. This observed
lack of congruence may be inhibiting performance
and unconsciously perpetuating a cycle of caution and
an over-reliance on stability and control. The data outlined in this study is illustrative of an organization that
emphasizes stability, control, formalized structures,
and a results oriented—get the job done—culture that
attempts to comprehend the ambiguity of the future
through an unconscious reliance upon the successful
solutions employed in the past, a process also known
as the “irony of success” (Paparone and Reed, 2008).
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IS THE ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE
OF THE U.S. ARMY
CONGRUENT WITH THE PROFESSIONAL
DEVELOPMENT
OF ITS SENIOR LEVEL OFFICER CORPS?
INTRODUCTION
Organizational Culture.
“Studies of organizational culture share a common
goal: to uncover and interpret aspects of organizational life so that we can better understand the perceptions, beliefs, and actions of organizational members”
(Martin et al., 1997, p. 3). An organization’s culture
enables its members to work through the basic problems of survival in and adaptation to the external environment as well as to develop and maintain internal
processes that perpetuate adaptability and promote
the organization’s continued existence (Parsons, 1951;
Merton, 1957; Schein, 1985, Martin, 2002).
Some organizational leaders and researchers might
ask why the study of organizational culture and its
impact on the professional development of an organization’s leaders is so important. Schein states that
it is important because organizational culture is the
property of a group and that:
. . . it is a powerful, latent, and often unconscious
set of forces that determine both our individual and
collective behavior, ways of perceiving, thought patterns, and values. Organizational culture in particular
matters because cultural elements determine strategy,
goals, and modes of operating. The values and thought
patterns of leaders and senior managers are partially
determined by their own cultural backgrounds and
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their shared experience. If we want to make organizations more efficient and effective, then we must understand the role that culture plays in organizational life
(1999, p. 14).

Since organizations are groupings of human beings who have come together to achieve collectively
what cannot be accomplished individually, it is understandable that organizational cultures are influenced
by a variety of social processes that gradually develop
over time and in response to environmental uncertainties and conditions (Barnard, 1938). As these varying
human systems attach meaning to their experiences,
thereby socially constructing their own interpretation
of reality3 (Berger and Luckmann, 1966), they give rise
to cultural differences, which can be viewed as being
manifested by an interrelated and differentiated series of levels or layers. Trice and Beyer describe these
environmental influences of the cultural evolutionary
process by stating that the:
. . . substance of an organization’s culture resides in
its ideologies, which are emotionalized, shared sets of
beliefs, values, and norms that both impel people to
action and justify their actions to themselves and others. Cultures have multiple ideologies; the ideas they
express sometimes complement and sometimes contradict each other. . . . Some of the ideologies in organizations are imported from at least six levels of their
environments: transnational systems, nations, regions
and communities, industries, occupations, and other
organizations (1993, pp. 75-76).

As indicated by Trice and Beyer, individual behavior is routinely influenced by a number of frequently
conflicting cultures and cultural values. Figure 1 provides a graphic representation of the layered nature
2

of culture as well as the interrelationships between
these varying levels or layers, which can be complementary or contradictory in nature depending on
the communities and organizations to which an individual maintains membership. The outermost ring
of Figure 1 depicts “Transnational” cultures, which
are those cultures whose members share a set of deep
basic underlying assumptions that transcend national
boundaries. For example, science and religion are two
typical transnational cultures. Regardless of an individual’s nationality or ethnic background, their affiliation with a given religious faith is characteristic of
a particular set of beliefs, values, and norms, which
readily identify them as, for example, being Christian,
Jewish, Islamic, Buddhist, and so on.

Adapted from Mary Jo Hatch, Organization Theory: Modern,
Symbolic, and Postmodern Perspectives, New York: Oxford University, 1997, p. 227.

Figure 1. A Graphic Portrayal of the Layered
and Interrelated Nature of Environmental
Influences on Organizational Culture.
3

The second layer of culture, as depicted in Figure 1,
is identified as “National” culture, which is perceived
as representing either national or ethnic association
(Trice and Beyer, 1993; Hofstede, 2001). For example,
self-reliance, personal achievement, and individualism are characteristic cultural values of American national culture, while Japanese national culture de-emphasizes individualism and personal achievement in
favor of selfless cooperation, collective achievement,
and consensus (Ouchi, 1981).
The third ring or layer is described by Trice and
Beyer (1993) as “Regional” culture. Breton indicates
that regional culture is based on identification with a
specific geographical area or territory; the people, and
the social institutions, whereby this physical locale
is transformed into a “social space” (1981, p. 58). For
example, within a characteristic national culture such
as the United States, there are distinctive regional cultures. Those customs and norms typical to the New
England states are in many cases dramatically different than those typically found in Southern states such
as South Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama (Kluckhohn
and Strodtbeck, 1961).The fourth layer of culture as
described by Trice and Beyer (1993) is comprised of
cultures of various industries, occupations, and other
organizations. In Figure 1, this fourth layer is depicted by three equivalent circles representing “Organizational,” “Professional,” and “Military” cultures,
which are particularly pertinent to this study. At this
level, the individual is intimately involved with the
day-to-day operations, activities, norms, and ideologies of social life that guide behavior in context specific ways (Trice and Beyer, 1993). Perhaps the most
common organizational setting that an individual at
this level experiences is the work environment, the ac-
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tual organization with whom they are employed, such
as IBM or the U.S. Army. In general, organizational
culture is considered to be very stable and difficult to
change because it represents the collective repertoire
of thinking, feeling, and perceiving that have enabled
the organization to successfully adapt to and react to
internal and external environmental stimulus (Schein,
1999). Organizational culture is often defined as the
unconscious yet “learned, shared, tacit assumptions
on which people base their daily behavior” (Schein,
1999, p. 24). With respect to professional organizations,4 among the many occupations that are traditionally perceived as being professions such as doctors
and lawyers, military officers are also distinguished
as being part of a profession as identified by Janowitz,
1971; Mosher, 1982; Schon, 1983; Huntington, 1985;
Abbott, 1988; Snider and Watkins, 2002; Snider, 2005;
Snider et al., 2009; and Moten, 2010. Mosher states that
the significance of professions is that they are “social
mechanisms, whereby knowledge, particularly new
knowledge is translated into action and service” (1982,
p. 112). Of particular importance to this study, as will
be discussed in greater detail later in the monograph,
is the level of congruence between an organization’s
culture and the professional development of its senior
leaders. As indicated by Trice and Beyer (1993) and
their layered nature of environmental influences as
depicted in Figure 1, this study evaluates the possibility that an organization’s culture unconsciously guides
the professional development and education of those
members who will be become the senior leaders, and
eventually the professional elite of the profession, in
such a manner that these future leaders may be inadequately prepared to lead the profession toward future
success. Schein provides an insightful analysis of this
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perspective by stating that the “bottom line for leaders
is that if they do not become conscious of the cultures
in which they are embedded, those cultures will manage them. Cultural understanding is desirable for all
of us, but it is essential to leaders if they are to lead”
(1992, p. 15).
The fifth and smallest ring depicted in Figure 1
is identified as “Sub-Cultures.” Deal and Kennedy
(1982) state that within any organization there may be
a variety of behavioral variations based on the extent
of the differentiation of tasks performed by the organization. For example, in the Army profession, there
are infantry, armor, artillery, medical, nurse, special
forces, engineers, and finance officers to name just a
few of the occupational branch specialties that comprise the Army officer corps. This diversity of occupational communities and their underlying technologies, training, and processes can create the:
. . . basic problem of integration and coordination that
is often the most difficult part of general management
in that one is attempting to bring into alignment organizational members who have genuinely different
points of view based on their education and experience in the organization (Schein, 1992, p. 258).

One of the underlying objectives of this study is to
determine the level of congruence between the various subcultures of the Army profession, such as officer branch, source of commission, age, sex, etc., and
the basic culture and values of the overall Army profession.
Cultural Manifestation. The preceding discussion
briefly outlines Trice and Beyer’s thesis of how at least
six layers or levels of cultural influence can be used
6

as models to explain and legitimate collective and individual behavior (Trice and Beyer, 1993). These next
few paragraphs highlight Schein’s three levels of cultural manifestation, which is the underlying model
upon which the foundation of the present study is
built. Using this approach Schein emphasizes that
individual and collective organizational behavior, as
described above, is visible or manifested at three levels which vary from extremely overt at the artifactual
level to deeply embedded unconscious assumptions,
which Schein defines as being the essence of culture
(1992). Briefly, Schein states that the manifestation of
organizational culture occurs at three levels: “artifacts,
values, and basic underlying assumptions” (1985, p.
14).
Schein indicates that artifacts are the most visible
expression of culture. They represent the physical
construct of the organization and its social environment. Organizational artifacts include such visible
phenomena as: language, technology and products,
rites and rituals, myths, uniforms or other manner of
dress, the physical layout or architecture of building
space, mission and value statements, organizational
stories, symbols, and ceremonies. Artifacts are easily
observable; however, they only provide a superficial
glimpse of an organization’s culture because the true
significance or meaning that lies behind their use can
be difficult to decipher and interpret.
Schein indicates that the second level of cultural
manifestation, values, provides organizational members with a sense of what ought to be as opposed to
what actually is. Values are a deeper level of culture,
which provide guidance in the face of ambiguity.
Schein believes that organizational values are not
as apparent as organizational artifacts. However, he
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states that they do exist at a greater level of awareness than basic underlying assumptions, which he
identifies as his third level of cultural manifestation.
For example, the U.S. Army articulates seven core values assumed to represent the true cultural essence of
the Army profession: loyalty, duty, respect, selflessservice, honor, integrity, and personal courage. Each
officer is expected to uphold these values, especially
when they are confronted with ambiguous or ethically
demanding situations (FM 6-22, 2006). As is discussed
later in this monograph, organizations sometimes
espouse values that they believe are appropriate for
given situations. Consequently, organizations publicly give allegiance to these values and attempt to communicate them to their members, external stakeholders, and frequently to the general public. Espoused
values are often evident in organizational strategies,
goals, philosophies, training programs, and published
organizational value statements. However, espoused
values may not be based on prior cultural learning;
therefore they may be incongruent with the organization’s actual theories-in-use (Argyris and Schon,
1974). Theories-in-use are those values that actually
govern behavior. It is postulated that a lack of congruence between espoused values and theories-in-use can
inhibit individual commitment and consequently impair organizational performance (Argyris and Schon,
1974; Schon, 1983; Schein, 1992).
Finally, the third and deepest level of organizational cultural manifestation, as defined by Schein, can be
found in an organization’s “basic underlying assumptions.” These basic underlying assumptions evolve
from the continuous use of a problem solution that
has repeatedly been successful in the past and has unconsciously become taken for granted as the only way
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to solve similar problems. Therefore, organizational
members instinctively perceive these basic underlying
assumptions as “nonconfrontable and nondebatable”
(Schein, 1985, p. 18). Argyris and Schon indicate that
the incontrovertible and unconscious nature of these
basic underlying assumptions can inhibit “doubleloop learning.” Double-loop learning is a process that
encourages organizational members to question all organizational practices, especially successful practices,
thereby promoting continuous organizational growth,
adaptability, and environmental awareness to include
accepting changes in beliefs, values, and assumptions
(1974).
Importance of Organizational Culture Analysis.
Schneider (1994) highlights the importance of organizational culture by stating that organizational
culture provides consistency for the organization and
its members and provides the organization’s leaders
with an internally reliable system of leadership that
is firmly rooted in previous success. Sathe (1983, p.
5) indicates that culture plays a “subtle but pervasive
role in organizational life” and that through a better
understanding of organizational culture, organizational leaders can effectively operate within it, deviate
from it, and when necessary, change it. Cameron and
Quinn concur with these assessments. They state that
most “organizational scholars and observers now recognize that organizational culture has a powerful effect on the performance and long-term effectiveness of
organizations” (1999, p. 4). Consequently, they define
culture as the “taken-for-granted values, underlying
assumptions, expectations, collective memories, and
definitions present in an organization” (p. 14), which
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is very similar to the conceptual model provided by
Schein as discussed in greater detail in the next section of this paper. Cameron and Quinn indicate that
organizational culture is an ideology that organizational members “carry inside their heads” (p. 14). It
provides them with a sense of identity and unwritten,
unspoken, unconscious courses of action for how to
get along in the organization while maintaining a stable social system within their organizational environment. They assert that generally speaking, each culture is comprised of “unique language, symbols, rules,
and ethnocentric feelings” (p. 15), which are reflected
by what the organization values, its definitions of success and the dominant leadership styles that pervade
the organization. They believe that an organization’s
culture is what makes the organization unique, which
is a similar assessment to that of Schneider, who states
that organizational culture “parallels individual character” (1994, p. 15).
The common theme which intertwines the theses
of these authors is that organizational culture is a critical factor in the long-term effectiveness and survivability of organizations. Consequently, those senior
leaders who are charged with providing strategic
direction and vision for their organizations must not
underestimate the importance of culture and must
realize that they are responsible for the analysis and
management of their own organization’s culture. As
such, they must be capable of developing strategies
for measuring their cultures, changing them, and for
implementing a process to accomplish all of the above
(Cameron and Quinn, 1999; Schein, 1999).
Conceptual Model for the Study. For the purposes
of this research, Schein’s conceptual model of organizational culture, as briefly outlined earlier in this
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monograph, is used as the framework upon which
this study and its subsequent analysis is constructed.
Figure 2 uses the metaphor of an ocean-going iceberg
to graphically represent Schein’s three levels of the
manifestation of organizational culture.

Figure 2. Iceberg Conceptual Model of Schein’s
Three Levels of the Manifestation
of Organizational Culture.
Just like the peak of an iceberg, which is the most
visible portion of the iceberg even at great distances,
organizational artifacts are the most visible manifestation of an organization’s culture (Schein, 1992). However, organizational artifacts are often undecipherable
and inadequately represent an organization’s culture
just like the peak of an iceberg inadequately represents
the true size of the iceberg, the bulk of which is hidden beneath the surface of the ocean. Organizational
values can provide a greater level of awareness of an
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organization’s culture; however, the researcher must
be able to discern the differences between espoused
values and theories-in-use. As previously discussed,
espoused values are those values that an organization
publicly acknowledges and supports, while theoriesin-use are those underlying values which are less visible and which actually govern behavior. For example,
an organization may publicly state that it supports
individual initiative, while concurrently refusing to
promote individuals whose initiative resulted in failure. In the iceberg metaphor, organizational values,
are closer to the surface and provide a more accurate
assessment of the organization’s culture. However,
the true scope of the culture still remains hidden beneath the surface. Finally, Schein (1992) emphasizes
that the essence of an organization’s culture is its taken-for-granted basic underlying assumptions. These
basic underlying assumptions provide: consistency
for its members, order and structure, boundaries and
ground rules, membership criteria, communication
patterns, conditions for rewards, punishment, and the
use of power. They define effective performance, they
identify appropriate internal personnel relationships,
and they limit organizational strategy (Schneider,
1994). Like the iceberg, the true depth and breadth
of an organization’s culture lies beneath the surface
and is very difficult to recognize through superficial
analysis. Schein (1985) underscores the importance
of cultural analysis by indicating that it is through an
in-depth study of an organization’s culture that one
can develop a greater appreciation of “the way we do
things around here” (Bower, 1966; Deal and Kennedy,
1982, p. 4). Additionally, a robust appreciation of an
organization’s culture can help to explain why organizational members sometimes exhibit “mysterious,
silly, or irrational” behavior (Schein, 1985, p. 21).
12

An Overview of Professional Organizations.
An analysis of the extant literature concerning professional organizations, those organizations that exhibit mastery of an area of abstract knowledge, control
a contested jurisdiction, and that possess social legitimacy (Abbott, 1988; Burk, 2002), indicates that these
organizations are generally characterized by adaptive,
innovative, flexible, risk-taking, and future-oriented
behavior (Argyris and Schon, 1974; Kline, 1981; Freidson, 1970, 1986; Abbott, 1988; Schon, 1983; Senge,
1994; Davis et al., 1997; FM 22-100, 1999; Snider and
Watkins, 2002; Paparone, 2003; FM 6-22, 2006). The
essential focus of these generic characterizations is
that professions and professional organizations must
continuously seek to expand their knowledge base
as well as their level of expertise in order to remain
relevant to society (Freidson, 1970, 1986; Argyris and
Schon, 1974; Mosher, 1982; Abbott, 1988, Magee and
Somervell, 1998; Burk, 2002; Snider 2005). Argyris and
Schon emphasize this point by stating that the “foundation for future professional competence seems to be
the capacity to learn how to learn” (1974, p. 157). This
“reflexive” thinking process is one of the hallmarks
of professional practice and survival (Schon, 1983;
Abbott, 1988; Snider and Watkins, 2002; Snider et al.,
2009; Moten, 2010).
Since organizational culture can be found at every level of an organization, and since organizational
members are multicultural entities, as indicated earlier, understanding an organization’s culture is significant (Schein, 1999). Consequently, the long-term
strategic decisions made by the senior leaders of an organization are influenced by their multicultural back-
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ground, but especially by the organization in which
they have spent the bulk of their lives, such as members of professional organizations like doctors, lawyers, and military officers (Schein, 1999). Professional
organizations exist in a competitive environment
where their social jurisdiction and legitimacy can only
be supported or perpetuated as long as they maintain
their expertise over an area of abstract knowledge that
society perceives as important (Freidson, 1970, 1986;
Abbott, 1988; Burk, 2002). Since organizational culture
is hypothesized to have a considerable impact on organizational behavior, this study attempts to examine
the congruence between organizational culture and
the professional leadership and managerial skills of
the U.S. Army and its senior leaders (Deal and Kennedy, 1982; Cameron and Freeman, 1991).
Purpose of the Present Study.
This study postulates that the ability of a professional organization to develop future leaders in a
manner that perpetuates an enhanced organizational
readiness to cope with future environmental and internal uncertainty depends on organizational culture.
Specifically, the purpose of this study is to explore
the relationship between organizational culture and
professional development by examining the level of
congruence between the U.S. Army’s organizational
culture and the professional leadership and managerial skills of its officer corps senior leaders.
A formalized professional development program
is normatively conceptualized by the U.S. Army as a
process whereby the leaders of tomorrow are identified, trained, and given progressively more responsible assignments to enable them to be capable of per-
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forming duties at the highest levels of the organization
later in their careers. Specifically, the U.S. Army states
that the:
. . . driving principle behind Army leader development is that leaders must be prepared before assuming leadership positions; they must be competent and
confident in their abilities. . . . In turn, leader development rests on a foundation of training and education,
expectations and standards, and values and ethics.
This foundation supports the three leader development pillars: institutional training (schooling), operational assignments, and self-development (FM 22-100,
1999, p. 5-14).

This study uses the Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI) and the Managerial Skills
Assessment Instrument (MSAI) to provide empirical
data indicating the level of congruence between the
organizational culture of the U.S. Army and the professional development of its senior level officer corps.
The senior level officer corps of the U.S. Army consists
of those individuals from whom the future leaders of
the Army profession will be selected. For the purposes
of this study, the U.S. Army senior level officer corps
is defined as those lieutenant colonels and colonels
who have been selected to attend the U.S. Army War
College through a rigorous evaluation board process.
Hence, the primary research question of this study is:
Is the organizational culture of the U.S. Army congruent with the professional development of its senior level officer corps?
It is anticipated that by answering this primary
research question that this study provides empirical
support for the premise that the future success of a
professional organization is dependent upon the con-
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gruence between an organization’s culture and the
manner in which its senior leaders are prepared to
manage uncertainty and ambiguity. This study evaluates the hypothesis, as enumerated in the extant literature, that if the organization’s current culture is out of
synchronization with future environmental demands,
then the leaders who are conditioned by this current
culture will have difficulty guiding the organization
toward future success.
The pragmatic objective of this study is to assist
the U.S. Army in its current attempt to transform its
culture to one that truly embraces professional characteristics. The Army seeks to develop leaders whose behavior can be characterized as innovative, risk-taking,
boundary spanning, demanding continuous improvement, reflective-in-action, dynamic, and adaptive. The
practical importance of the Army’s cultural transformation is succinctly indicated by Cameron and Quinn
when they state that “[w]ithout culture change, there
is little hope of enduring improvement in organizational performance” (1999, p. 13).
Significance of the Study. This exploratory study
begins to fill a gap in the organizational culture and
professional development literature in that no major
attempts have been made to relate the professional
development of an organization’s senior leaders to its
organizational culture. The investigation of this relationship has significant analytical potential. For example, if the survival of the Army profession is based
upon its ability to readily and continuously adapt to
a changing external environment (Mosher, 1982; Freidson, 1986; Abbott, 1988; Senge, 1994; Martin and
McCausland, 2002; Snider, 2003, 2003a; Gordon and
Sollinger 2004; Snider et al., 2009; Moten, 2010), can
the Army’s organizational culture inherently prevent
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it from successful professional competition because of
the way it educates its future leaders? Essentially, does
the unconscious pattern of ambiguity reduction, “the
way we do things around here” (Bower, 1966; Deal and
Kennedy, 1982, p. 4), create a pattern of “homosocial
reproduction” (Kanter 1977)? Martin (2002) describes
homosocial reproduction as a process whereby those
who are selected and prepared to eventually become
the future leaders of the Army tend to reflect the patterns of existing leaders and therefore foster a perpetuation of existing values and culture. Consequently,
the continuation of a given culture may or may not
support innovative, boundary spanning, risk-taking
leadership that may be necessary to guarantee the future survival of the organization or profession.
While this study examines the senior level leaders
of the U.S. Army and is focused toward the Army as a
profession, it is believed that the results of this analysis will have a beneficial impact on organizational
literature as a whole, and specifically on that which
relates to the professional development of all professions. Schon states that the “technical extension of
bureaucracy, which reinforces the confinement of professional work to precisely defined channels of technical expertise, exacerbates the inherent conflict between bureaucracy and professional identity. Within
highly specialized, technically administered systems
of bureaucratic control, how can professionals think
of themselves as autonomous practitioners” (1983, p.
337)? As indicated by Schein at the beginning of this
monograph and as indicated throughout the Army’s
literature concerning leadership, “the only thing of
real importance that leaders do is to create and manage culture and that unique talent of leaders is their
ability to understand and work with culture. If one
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wishes to distinguish leadership from management or
administration, one can argue that leaders create and
change cultures, while managers and administrators
live within them” (Schein, 1992, p. 5). The implication
is that culture is both a metaphor that describes organizations as well as a variable that can be manipulated, although not easily (Smircich, 1983). Therefore,
if an organization’s culture prevents it from developing its leaders to be capable of successfully posturing
the organization to respond to the volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous external environment,
then, as Schein (1992) suggests, something must be
done about the culture. Specifically, Schein states that
“[o]rganizational cultures are created in part by leaders, and one of the most decisive functions of leadership is the creation, management, and sometimes even
the destruction of culture” (1992, p. 5). In conclusion,
this study attempts to determine if there is a level of
congruence between the Army’s organizational culture and its ability to professionally develop its future
leaders. In the case of the Army profession, this analysis relates to those senior leaders who will eventually
become the stewards of the profession (Snider and
Watkins, 2002).
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BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE CONCEPTS OF
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND
PROFESSIONALISM
Organizational Culture.
Rockefeller states that organizations possess a
logic of their own, which grows over the years and
is strengthened by the weight of tradition and inertia
(1973, p. 72). Today, organization theory commonly
refers to Rockefeller’s concept of organizational logic
as an organization’s culture. Schein defines organizational culture as:
. . . a pattern of basic assumptions, invented, discovered, or developed by a given group as it learns to
cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be
considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new
members as the correct way to perceive, think, and
feel in relation to those problems (1985, p. 9).

Particularly, Schein believes that the concept of
organizational culture can help to explain why organizations grow, change, fail, and “perhaps most importantly of all—do things that don’t seem to make
any sense” (1985, p. 1).
The concept of organizational culture has been
identified as one of the newest, and perhaps one of the
most controversial, subtopics of organizational theory
(Reichers and Schneider, 1990; Martin, 2002). The predominant reason underlying the spirited nature of the
debate surrounding the concept of organizational culture is the absence of a generally agreed upon “precise
definition of the concept and its separation from other
related concepts” (Cameron and Ettington, 1988, p.
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357). At the root of the debate is the fact that the theory
of organizational culture is comprised of many intangible concepts such as values, beliefs, assumptions,
perceptions, behavioral norms, artifacts, and patterns
of behavior (Reichers and Schneider, 1990). To the organizational theorist, culture “is to the organization
what personality is to the individual—a hidden, yet
unifying theme that provides meaning, direction, and
mobilization” (Shafritz, and Ott, 1992, p. 481). Just as
a dominant personality controls the actions of an individual, the organizational culture can significantly
control the behavior of individuals within an organization (Schneider, 1994). In fact, Schein explains that
the shared, tacit, taken-for-granted ways of thinking
and reacting that circumscribe the concept of culture
are the most powerful and stable forces operating
within organizations (1996). Accordingly, Martin et
al., emphasize that studies of organizational culture
share a common objective, which is “to uncover and
interpret aspects of organizational life so that we can
better understand the perceptions, beliefs, and actions
of organizational members” (1997, p. 3). If you want
to be able to comprehend the current behavior of an
organization, as well as to reasonably anticipate its
future actions, then you must be able to understand
these abstract organizational variables (Schein, 1999).
Organizations “are” Cultures vs. Organizations
“have” Cultures. Perhaps the most significant area of
debate concerning the concept of organizational culture centers on the origin of its disciplinary roots. The
anthropological tradition emphasizes that organizations are cultures, while the sociological tradition proposes that organizations have cultures. The anthropological tradition perceives organizational culture as a
dependent variable, while the sociological tradition
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views organizational culture as an independent variable. Within each of these two primary disciplines,
two sub-approaches have evolved; the functionalist
perspective and the semiotic perspective (Burrell and
Morgan, 1979; Smircich, 1983; Schein, 1985; Cameron
and Ettington, 1988; Cameron and Quinn, 1999; Martin, 2002). According to the functionalist perspective,
organizational culture is a “component of the social
system and assumes that it is manifested in organizational behaviors” (Cameron and Ettington, 1988, p.
359), which is evaluated from a researcher’s perspective
and at the organization level. The semiotic perspective
views culture as residing in the minds of individuals,
which is evaluated from the native’s perspective and
at the individual level (Cameron and Ettington, 1988;
Cameron and Quinn, 1999). Essentially, the functionalist perspective assumes that cultural differences can
be identified, measured, and changed (Cameron and
Quinn, 1999). The semiotic perspective assumes that
culture is an image of an organization (Morgan, 1986),
which resides in individual interpretations and perceptions, used to facilitate “understanding and communication about the complex phenomenon of organization” (Smircich, 1983, p. 340).
The Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument
(OCAI). Two key questions arise from the literature
concerning quantitative and qualitative analysis.
First, do quantitative analysis methods such as questionnaires and survey instruments provide only a superficial level of cultural understanding? Second, do
qualitative approaches lack the breadth of analysis to
conduct comparative studies among multiple cultures
because of the excessive time and energy expended on
only one organization’s culture? In reference to their
methodological technique, Cameron and Quinn (1999)
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state that their OCAI, which is based on the Competing Values Framework (CVF) initially developed by
Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1981, 1983), adequately addresses both of these methodological questions. Specifically Cameron and Quinn indicate that:
To conduct comparisons among multiple cultures,
quantitative approaches must be used. It is crucial,
however, that those responding to a survey instrument
actually report underlying values and assumptions
(culture), not just superficial attitudes or perceptions
(climate). This can be accomplished best, we argue, by
using a scenario analysis procedure in which respondents report the extent to which written scenarios are
indicative of their own organization’s culture. These
scenarios serve as cues—both emotionally and cognitively—that bring to the surface core cultural attributes. . . . Respondents may be unaware of crucial attributes of culture until they are cued by the scenarios
on the questionnaire (1999, p. 135).

The authors of this approach indicate that the
OCAI has been used to identify the current and preferred cultural types in thousands of organizations,
and that it has been found to predict organizational
performance (Cameron and Quinn, 1999). The validity
and reliability of this approach are well documented
and will not be discussed here (Freeman, 1991; Quinn
and Spreitzer, 1991; Yeung et al., 1991; Zammuto and
Krakower, 1991; Norusis, 1994; Collett and Mora,
1996; Cameron and Quinn, 1999; Berrio, 2003). The
CVF model, as operationalized by the OCAI, is believed to provide a hybrid solution to the functionalist-semiotic debate, discussed earlier in this section. It
does so by identifying the “aspects of the organization
that reflect key values and assumptions in the organization, and then give[s] individuals an opportunity
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to respond using their underlying archetypal framework” [basic underlying assumptions] (Cameron and
Quinn, 1999, p. 137). Specifically, OCAI respondents
are asked to answer questions representing six content dimensions, which Cameron and Quinn state represent “fundamental cultural values and implicit assumptions about the way the organization functions”
(1999, p. 137). These six dimensions are: dominant
characteristics, organizational leadership, management of employees, organizational glue, strategic emphases, and criteria for success. When combined with
the four cultural types enumerated by the CVF: clan,
adhocracy, market, and hierarchy (Cameron and Ettington, 1988), which are formed by the confluence of
two major dimensions of effectiveness: internal focus
and integration versus external focus and differentiation; and stability and control versus flexibility and
discretion, the six cultural content dimensions are
able to elicit “the fundamental organizing framework
used by people when they obtain, interpret, and draw
conclusions about information” (Cameron and Quinn,
1999, p. 136). See Figure 3. Consequently, the OCAI is
able to uncover the underlying organizational culture,
which is an ambiguous, complex, and non-linear socially constructed shared meaning, difficult to observe
and even more so to quantify. The OCAI enables the
researcher to identify an organization’s predominant
cultural type as well as the relative strength of the four
basic cultural types briefly identified above. Finally,
the OCAI allows the researcher to evaluate the level
of cultural congruence in an organization. Cultural
congruence refers to the degree to which the “various
aspects of the organization’s culture are aligned. That
is, the same culture types are emphasized in the various parts of the organization” (Cameron and Quinn,
1999, p. 64).
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Figure 3. The Competing Values of Leadership,
Effectiveness, and Organizational
Theory (Cameron & Quinn, 1999, p. 41).
Even though the authors of the OCAI approach
indicate that this cultural research technique is primarily representative of the functionalist tradition,
which treats organizational culture as a variable, they
also acknowledge the ambiguous and unmanageable
aspects, which are representative of the semiotic perspective. Additionally, the technique combines some
of the more positive aspects of both quantitative and
qualitative research methodologies. The dimensions
graphically portrayed in Figure 3, and the four cultural type quadrants which they produce, “appear to be
very robust in explaining the different orientations, as
well as the competing values, that characterize human
behavior. . . . That is, each quadrant represents ba-
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sic assumptions, orientations, and values—the same
elements that comprise an organizational culture”
(Cameron and Quinn, 1999, p. 33). Consequently, the
OCAI and the underlying CVF approach were chosen
for this study because the CVF has been empirically
developed and has been found to have both face and
empirical validity (Cameron and Quinn, 1999). Additionally, the OCAI is a predominantly quantitative instrument that has been developed in such a manner as
to elicit subjective qualitative-type responses from respondents. Therefore, the OCAI can be considered to
be of a hybrid nature in that it incorporates both quantitative and qualitative aspects of research design, and
the instrument has been found to have a high level of
documented reliability and validity.
Professionalism and Professional Development.
Despite the significant amount of ambiguity and
imprecision that can be found in the extent literature
concerning professions and what it means to be professional, there are some common notions of the concept, which appear to have achieved some tacit agreement among researchers and theorists (Golembiewski,
1983). Among these areas of agreement is Abbott’s position that the “tasks of professions are human problems [which are] amenable to expert service” (1988,
p. 35). This study accepts the generic proposition that
professional status is based on competency whereby
individuals in high status occupations translate abstract knowledge into action, and that this action is
undertaken to help people confront important societal problems which they are incapable of solving for
themselves (Eulau, 1973; Mosher, 1982; Huntington,
1985; Freidson, 1986; Abbott, 1988; Burk, 2002). Gar-
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gan emphasizes that a “distinguishing characteristic
of the context of professionalism, cited by essentially
all observers, is autonomy, the notion that if professionals are to be held accountable for their decisions
they must be allowed discretion, the right to make
choices which concern both means and ends” (1998,
p. 1091). Consequently, Freidson (1986) indicates
that professional autonomy and special privilege are
conferred upon professions by society because of the
profession’s mastery or expertise in an area of formal
abstract knowledge which is traditionally considered
to be in the interest of society as a whole, examples include: law, medicine, engineering, teaching, the ministry, and defense.
In his book discussing “the system of professions,”
Andrew Abbott provides a succinct description of the
historical definitions of professions by stating that
professions “were organized bodies of experts who
applied esoteric knowledge to particular cases. They
had elaborate systems of instruction and training, together with entry by examination and other formal
prerequisites . . . [and] . . . They normally possessed
and enforced a code of ethics or behavior” (1988, p. 4).
Abbott also emphasizes that in relation to the professional development of individual professionals, “the
academic knowledge system of a profession generally
accomplishes three tasks—legitimation, research, and
instruction—and, in each, it shapes the vulnerability
of professional jurisdiction to outside interference”
(1988, p. 57). Here, Abbott is implying that the future
survival of the profession is shaped by the organizational culture of that profession; in this case, its unconscious willingness to expand the boundaries of its professional abstract knowledge. He indicates that if the
profession is incapable of keeping pace with a rapidly
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changing external environment, then the profession
will face serious competition from other professions
and lose its legitimacy and socially granted professional jurisdiction. Relevant to this study, Snider and
Watkins (2002) warn that the U.S. Army’s culture is
preventing its senior leaders from developing the
managerial and leadership skills that will enable them
to guide the Army profession into the future and to
ensure that it keeps pace with its rapidly changing
external national security environment. For example,
they state that “[m]icromanagement has become part
of the Army culture, producing a growing perception
that lack of trust stems from the leader’s desire to be
invulnerable to criticism and blocks the opportunity
for subordinates to learn through leadership experiences” (2002, p. 10), and contributing to the subsequent “flight of talented young officers” (Wardynski
et al., 2010a, p. iii).
In reference to military professions, Huntington, in
his work discussing the theory and politics of civilmilitary relations, identifies those technical, personal,
ethical, and doctrinal skills that must be mastered to
successfully wage war in support of national values
and national security strategy as the abstract knowledge intrinsic to the “management of violence” (1985,
p. 11). Specifically, Huntington (1985) outlines three
characteristics of professionalism; expertise, responsibility, and corporateness, which he believes distinguish the professional from the amateur. He indicates
that expertise refers to “specialized knowledge and
skill in a significant field of human endeavor” (p. 8).
He states that responsibility implies that a professional is a “practicing expert, working in a social context,
and performing a service, such as the promotion of
health, education, or justice, which is essential to the

27

functioning of society” (p. 9). Finally, Huntington describes professional corporateness as the shared “sense
of organic unity and consciousness of themselves as a
group apart from layman” (p. 10) that the members of
a profession possess.
Abbott (1988) believes that the key aspect of professions is their ability to acquire and control various
types of knowledge, and as will be discussed shortly,
their ability to compete for and maintain a dominance over their specialized knowledge. Professional
dominance over a given area of abstract knowledge is
important because as Freidson states, “knowledge is
power” (1986, p. 1), consequently, the ability of a profession to sustain its societally granted “jurisdiction”
depends upon its ability to expand this knowledge
base while concurrently maintaining the profession’s
mastery of it (Abbott, 1988). Gargan concurs and indicates that when “a profession’s extant core knowledge
and associated substantive, methodological, and theoretical issues are undergoing attack or rapid change,
the profession as a whole must be concerned with the
emergent knowledge and the mechanisms available
for transmitting the new knowledge to students and
to practitioners in the field” (1998, p. 1090). These foregoing statements highlight three key aspects of professionalism: expertise, legitimacy, and jurisdiction,
which Abbott (1988) states represent the environment
within which professions exist.
Expertise. By traditional definition, professional
practice is considered to be essential to the functioning
of society and usually exceeds the capabilities of the
average citizen because of the extensive amount of education, which frequently takes years to complete and
is normally representative of a lifelong vocation (Abbott, 1988; Mosher, 1982; Freidson, 1986; Burrage and
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Torstendahl, 1990, Snider, 2003a). Due to the inherent
requirement for individual professionals to maintain
a high level of expertise, professions dedicate significant resources to the initial and recurring training of
their members, especially new members (Huntington,
1985; Snider, 2003a). The continuous education which
occurs over the lifetime of individual professionals
is commonly referred to by the U.S. Army as professional development (FM 22-100, 1999; FM 6-22, 2006).
Professional development includes the moral obligation to generate a professional ethic and to promulgate standards of practice that are in keeping with the
public trust. If professions uphold their social responsibility and sustain the public’s trust, then “[W]estern
societies generally grant a large degree of autonomy
to set standards, to police their ranks, and to develop
their future members” (Snider, 2003a, p. 4).
Additionally, the ability of a profession to maintain the legitimacy and autonomy to exercise its esoteric knowledge for the benefit of society depends
upon the profession’s continuous capacity to expand
the boundaries of its current knowledge base and to
acquire new and more specialized skills (Mosher,
1982; Beckman, 1990). Mosher (1982) emphasizes this
point by stating that professions display several common characteristics, one of which is the necessity for
the professions to enhance their stature within society
and to strengthen their public image as seen by society. Additionally, Mosher states that:
A prominent device for furthering this goal is the establishment of the clear and (where possible) expanding boundaries of work within which members of the
profession have exclusive prerogatives to operate.
Other means include: the assurance and protection of
career opportunities for professionals; the establish-
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ment and continuous elevation of standards of education and entrance into the profession; the upgrading of
rewards (pay) for professionals; and the improvement
of their prestige before their associates and before the
public in general (1982, p. 117).

There is also an expectation to pass these new skills
and knowledge on to a new generation of professionals through a variety of formalized educational programs, institutions, and professional schools. Cook
highlights the importance of professional formal education by stating that entry “into any profession is a
kind of initiation into a body of knowledge primarily,
if not exclusively, generated, transmitted, and built
upon by fellow members of the profession” (2002, p.
345).
The significance of the necessity for professions to
continuously expand the boundaries of their esoteric
knowledge and specialized skills lies in the concept
of legitimacy, which provides justification for “what
professions do and how they do it” (Abbott, 1988, p.
184). Underlying this monopoly of specialized esoteric knowledge are the interrelated concepts of trust and
social responsibility. Together, legitimacy, trust, and
social responsibility are the focus of the next section
of this chapter.
Legitimacy. When society grants to a profession the
privilege of exercising nearly monopolistic authority
and autonomy in an area of expert knowledge such
as law, medicine, and national defense, the profession is seen to be operating as a legitimate agent of
society (Freidson, 1986). Trust forms the foundation
upon which this symbiotic relationship is built. Consequently, the professions are afforded a high degree
of autonomy, to include self-regulation, licensing, regulation of the conduct of individual members, and the
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development of professional skills and a professional
ethic. In return, they pledge to society that the members of the profession will act in an altruistic manner
for the benefit of society (Brien, 1998). Snider (2003a)
indicates that professions dedicate significant portions
of their professional development programs to training of professional ethics and standards of practice
for the explicit purpose of maintaining a high level of
trust between the profession and society.
Jurisdiction. Abbott states that “diagnosis, treatment, inference, and academic work provide the cultural machinery of jurisdiction” (1988, p. 59). What
sets this professional process apart from occupations
is the fact that social problems such as medical health,
legal interpretation, and national defense do not have
routine solutions. For example, when senior military
officers are preparing a combat plan to provide to
the President, they are relying on an esoteric body of
knowledge that has been developed and refined for
thousands of years on how to fight wars. However,
each situation requires an in-depth analysis, a “diagnosis” of all current and potentially relevant factors
such as the readiness of military units, geography,
logistical support, international support, local nation support, to name only a few. Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM is an excellent case-in-point. Using this diagnostic process, which includes the vast experience
of thousands of military professionals, senior military
leaders develop a campaign plan, which in the professional vernacular is a “treatment” as described by
Abbott above. Once the treatment is implemented,
another analysis of the effectiveness of that treatment
is initiated, and Abbott calls this analysis process “inference.” The U.S. Army refers to these analyses as
“after-action-reviews,” which is a process it uses to
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provide lessons learned to the Army profession (FM
22-100, 1999; FM 6-22, 2006). Finally, the entire “diagnosis, treatment, and inference” process becomes the
basis of the formalized professional development programs of the various professions. These experiences
frequently become articles in professional journals or
become the content of professional training courses,
thereby expanding the professional body of knowledge for future professionals to learn as they progress
through their initial or recurrent training programs
(Schon, 1983; Abbott, 1988).
The greater the success that professions achieve in
solving complex social problems, the greater the probability that they have of achieving professional legitimacy as described in the preceding section (Freidson,
1986; Abbott, 1988). Professional legitimacy enables
professions to claim control of a particular kind of
work such as medicine, law, or national defense. Abbott states that:
In claiming jurisdiction, a profession asks society to
recognize its cognitive structure through exclusive
rights; jurisdiction has not only a culture, but also a
social structure. These claimed rights may include absolute monopoly of practice and of public payments,
rights of self-discipline and of unconstrained employment, control of professional training, of recruitment,
and of licensing, to mention only a few. . . . This control means first and foremost a right to perform the
work as professionals see fit. Along with the right to
perform the work as it wishes, a profession normally
also claims rights to exclude other workers as deemed
necessary, to dominate public definitions of the tasks
concerned, and indeed to impose professional definitions of the tasks on competing professions. Public
jurisdiction, in short, is a claim of both social and cultural authority (1988, pp. 59 and 60).
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Professions compete for jurisdictional control with
other professions and with newly developing technologies, organizations, and occupations (Abbott, 1988;
Collins, 1990; Broadbent et al., 1997). Those professions that fail to successfully compete or that become
overly bureaucratized “may very well die, losing their
status as a profession” (Martin and McCausland, 2002,
p. 429). Abbott (1988) states that abstract knowledge,
the continuous expansion of that knowledge base,
and the practical professional skills that grow from
this system enable a profession to successfully defend
its jurisdiction from encroachment by others. Senge
(1994) emphasizes that the successful organizations of
the future will be those that can be characterized as
learning organizations. Senge defines a learning organization as:
. . . an organization that is continually expanding its
capacity to create its future. For such an organization,
it is not enough to merely survive. ‘Survival Learning’
or what is more often termed “adaptive learning” is
important—indeed, it is necessary. But for a learning
organization, “adaptive learning” must be joined by
“generative learning,” learning that enhances our capacity to create (1994, p. 14).

As such, LeBoeuf (2002) emphasizes that professions and professional organizations must be characterized as learning organizations whose primary
focus is directed toward the constant growth of their
expertise, practical professional skills, and the knowledge base that underlies their expertise. Martin and
McCausland (2002) agree with LaBoeuf. They emphasize that the task of ensuring that professional organizations stay focused on a strategy of “learning”
(Senge, 1994) and “reflection-in-action” (Schon, 1983)
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falls unequivocally to the senior and strategic leaders
of the organization. Specifically, Martin and McCausland state that:
Clearly one of the most vital tasks of those leading a
profession at the strategic level is to tend to the dynamic nature of change that affects the particular tasks
it is called upon to perform, as well as the associated
knowledge base. . . . In other words, unless the strategic leaders of the profession tend to the profession’s
body of expert knowledge and its effective application to new situations and tasks by the members of the
profession, they run the risk of competing poorly and
declining in standing, or legitimacy, with their client
[society] (2002, p. 428).

Additionally, Martin and McCausland emphasize
that the strategic leaders of professional organizations
“must provide purpose, direction, energy, motivation,
inspiration, and a clear professional identity” (2002,
p. 429) to the members of the profession. They must
do this by shaping the professional culture, and by
providing a strategic vision for the profession which
underscores the necessity for expanding the profession’s expert knowledge base and practical professional skills. Martin and McCausland (2002) state that
organizational strategic leaders must remain acutely
aware that the status of the profession’s legitimacy
and jurisdictional competitions will ultimately determine the future survival of the profession as it navigates through the ambiguity of its strategic external
environment.
The Army Profession. “To call an occupation a ‘profession’ is usually to make a positive normative judgment about the work being done, and since we think
that professional work is a social good, whatever we
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call professional work also reveals something about
what we believe is required for the well-being of society” (Burk, 2002, p. 19). When Huntington states that
“[t]he modern officer corps is a professional body and
the modern military officer a professional man” (1985,
p. 7), he too is making this distinction, and he is ascribing to the military profession those seven criteria of
professionalism as identified by Gargan (1998) earlier
in the previous sections of this monograph. In addition to Huntington’s (1985) analysis, a great deal of
the extent literature indicates that the officer corps of
the U.S. military constitutes a profession (Huntington, 1985; Janowitz, 1971; Freidson, 1973; Mosher,
1982; Schon, 1983; Freidson, 1986; Abbott, 1988; Abbott, 2002; Segal and Bourg, 2002; Snider and Watkins,
2002; Snider, 2003a). Finally, the Army acknowledges
its professional status by stating that the Army’s professional purpose is “to serve the American people,
protect our enduring national interests, and fulfill our
national military responsibilities. The Army, with the
other Services, deters conflict, reassures allies, defeats
enemies, and supports civil authorities” (FM 1, 2001,
p. 25). Consequently, this study accepts the premise
that there is an Army profession, which this author
believes has been satisfactorily argued by many theorists as identified in this monograph and as history
has proven as well.
The Army as a profession is focused on the development and application of the esoteric knowledge and
related practical professional skills of land warfare
(Snider, 2003a). The U.S. Army has a social responsibility to the people of the United States of America
to fight and win the nation’s wars and to preserve
and protect the American way of life. In addition, the
Army profession maintains a professional ethic of
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selfless service that is committed to the prevention of
abuse of its authority and power (FM 22-100, 1999; FM
6-22, 2006). While it may not be obvious to the casual
observer, the Army professional jurisdiction is in constant competition with other professions to include”
(Brinsfield, 2002) the naval (to include the Marine
Corps) and air professions, foreign military services,
“other government agencies, private contractors, and
nongovernmental organizations, both American and
international” (Snider and Watkins, 2002, p. 7).
Cook (2002) emphasizes that the main challenge
confronting Army professionalism today is the necessity for the profession to emphatically embrace the
rapidly evolving nature of the external strategic environment. Accordingly, the Army profession must
encourage intellectual professional development and
the transformation of its practical professional skills
in such a manner as to become adaptable, innovative,
and flexible in the face of this constantly changing external environment. Cook (2002) indicates that there
are benefits to analyzing the Army profession through
the “expertise, legitimacy, and jurisdiction” model as
explicated by Abbott. Specifically, Cook states that:
The benefit of viewing professions through Abbott’s
lens is that it avoids viewing the professions statically and ahistorically. Rather, it sees the profession
as evolving through time in interaction with its environment and with other claimants to the profession’s
jurisdiction. At the root of the challenge to Army professionalism is the necessity to create and sustain the
intellectual creativity to get ahead of environmental
changes, to embrace them, and to demonstrate the
intellectual flexibility to inspire the nation’s confidence that it can meet the demands of the changing
security environment with enthusiasm. Such a profession transmits and extends its corporate culture and
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its developing intellectual engagement with a body of
expert knowledge into the future (2002, p. 353).

The significance of the preceding comments lies in
their admonition for the furtherance of professional
intellectual skills and the necessity to pass this knowledge on to succeeding generations of professionals as
well as to pass on a culture of innovation. Wong emphasizes the necessity for professional innovation by stating that the Army profession “will require a change in
the way the Army approaches problems and issues. It
will require changing the Army’s culture to one where
subordinates are free to innovate” (2002, p. 30). The
ability to fully understand the strengths and weaknesses of the Army’s culture and to inculcate into that
culture a level of readiness and willingness to adapt
to the rapidly changing external environment is one
of the most significant challenges facing the Army’s
professional strategic leaders today (LeBoeuf, 2002).
“The strategic leadership of the Army must reinforce
and sustain a military that promotes the evolution of
professional expertise” (LeBoeuf, 2002, p. 495), particularly that which emphasizes professional development for its senior leaders and the attendant practical
professional skills that translate esoteric knowledge
into application. However, there is reason to believe
that the strategic leaders of the Army profession either
do not fully understand the significance of the professional development process or they simply do not
support it (ATLDP, 2001; LeBoeuf, 2002; Wardynski et
al., 2010b, 2010c; Moten, 2010). For example, LeBoeuf
(2002) states that personnel assignments that give little consideration for the professional development of
junior professionals by “simply injecting warm bodies into required slots” is an all too frequent example
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of the lack of senior leader support for professional
development (2002, p. 493). Consequently, the implication of the organizational culture and professional
literature discussed so far indicates that the:
Army cannot train its way out of these problems, but
must include a substantial educational and developmental component for all of the profession’s members.
Actions must be top-down, with strategic leaders
creating conditions for change, and bottom-up, with
junior officers educated, trained, and developed in a
manner more consistent with the demands of the profession and Army transformation (LeBoeuf, 2002, p.
499).

Since strategic leaders are tasked with understanding the tenets of professionalism and with fully understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the Army’s
culture (Martin and McCausland, 2002), they must be
aware of the “powerful, latent, and often unconscious
set of forces . . . [that] . . . determine strategy, goals,
and modes of operating” (Schein, 1999, p. 14), such
as the content, implementation, and results of professional development programs.
Army Organizational Culture and Professional Development. This study conducts an analysis of the level
of congruence between the organizational culture of
the U.S. Army and the professional development of
its senior leaders. The purpose is to determine if the
organizational culture of the U.S. Army is supportive
of the professional development of its officer corps in
general, but more specifically, its senior level officer
corps, the future leaders and protectors of the Army
profession. As implied by Snider and Watkins (2002),
Builder (1989), and by the acerbic remarks from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (Galloway, 2003),
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there is a great deal of concern that the U.S. Army
officer corps is at risk of transitioning from a professional organization to that of an obedient bureaucracy
(LeBoeuf, 2002). If such a transition were to occur, it is
postulated that the bureaucratic form of organization
will stifle the development of professional military
knowledge, and practical professional skills, particularly the abstract knowledge of the management and
conduct of land warfare (Janowitz, 1971; Schon, 1983;
Huntington, 1985; Snider and Watkins, 2002; Wong,
2002). Additionally, Wong (2002) indicates that there
is a concern that the ability of the Army profession to
develop innovative strategies to cope with the changing national security environment will be at risk if a
cultural shift was allowed to occur from that of a profession to that of a bureaucratic organization emphasizing standard operating procedures, and the “application of knowledge embedded in organizational
routine and process” (Snider and Watkins, 2002, p.
8). The hierarchical nature of the bureaucratic form
of organization and its focus on efficiency and a “do
more with less” philosophy creates a psychological
distance between organizational members and their
work. Unlike bureaucracies, the key to professional
organizations is their emphasis on the continuous development and expansion of their esoteric knowledge
and on their commitment to social responsibility as
manifested through a professional ethic and through
the promulgation of professional standards of conduct (Cook, 2002; Mattox, 2002; Snider and Watkins,
2002; Toner, 2002, Snider et al., 2009; Moten, 2010). Unlike professions, organizational members of a bureaucracy strive for machine-like efficiency and survival.
Consequently, these members view themselves as employees of the organization instead of actually being
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the organization. As a result, individual commitment,
accountability, and organizational identity are minimized (Peters, 1989). Snider and Watkins emphasize
that “[w]ith regard to social control, by nurturing the
profession’s ethic within its members, a profession offers a better means of shaping human behavior in situations of chaotic violence, stress, and ambiguity than
bureaucratic management can ever hope to achieve”
(2002, p. 11).
In an effort to close the gap between an apparent
imbalance between what the Army profession says
that it is and what it appears to be in actual practice,
the U.S. Army has commissioned several studies that
have attempted to investigate the organizational culture of the Army. However, these studies have tended
to be more focused on the concept of “organizational
climate” than on organizational culture (CSIS, 2000;
ATLDP, 2001; Snider and Watkins, 2002). Unlike organizational culture, organizational climate is an assessment of how individuals feel about the organization
to include such things as “the physical layout and the
way in which members of the organization interact
with each other” (Schein, 1992, p. 9). Schneider (1990)
indicates that the concepts of culture and climate have
a substantial degree of overlap, which is one of the
reasons many authors use the terms interchangeably.
However, being aware of and understanding these
differences and similarities is necessary for a greater
appreciation of the more complex construct of organizational culture.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) study commissioned by the Department of
Defense (DoD) has determined that the existing culture of the military is out of step with its professed
values. For example, the CSIS found that “[s]ome officers and NCOs in the field and fleet have views on
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the condition of the force that are at odds with those
expressed by senior military leaders in Washington . . .
[the survey] data in this [study] do not contradict the
theme of mistrust between top military leaders and
some officers and NCOs” (2000, p. 71). Additionally,
it concluded that the psychological environment in
which individual behavior occurs (organizational climate), if not modified, will result in a degradation of
the U.S. Army’s professional culture over time (CSIS,
2000; Snider and Watkins, 2002). The study strongly
indicates that a professional military culture does exist. However the fundamental values that underscore
the professional nature of the military are coming under increasing levels of stress, particularly because of
excessive deployments, for example, Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, which
may result in undesirable cultural changes, as pointed
out above (CSIS, 2000).
In their book discussing culture, careers, and climate in the Australian Army, Jans and Schmidtchen
stress that a professional military career development
program “is the major conduit by which Army cultural values are translated into professional behavior”
(2002, p. 103). Their evaluation underscores the significance of the present study by indicating that professional development is the process whereby current
organizational culture is converted into future professional behavior. Jans and Schmidtchen emphasize that
a formalized program of professional development
produces both desirable and undesirable outcomes.
For example, professional development programs
reinforce the Army’s culture of professionalism and
community, both of which are desirable. However,
the programs also strengthen the aspects of the organization’s culture that encourage hierarchy, conserva-
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tism, and an emphasis on rules and structure, which
are inimical to professionalism. Figure 4 provides
a graphic representation of the relationship among
organizational culture, professional development
programs, and the resulting leadership/managerial
skills that underscore professional behavior. It can be
seen that organizational values and ethics rest upon
the foundation provided by organizational culture. In
the case of the U.S. Army, the Army espouses seven
institutional values and ethics: loyalty, duty, respect,
selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage
through the use of the acronym “LDRSHIP” (FM 22100, 1999; FM 6-22, 2006). As mentioned previously,
values guide organizational members to strive toward
what ought to be as opposed to what is (Schein, 1992).
Upon these key values, the Army has built its professional development program, which consists of two
pillars: formal training and informal training.

Adapted from FM 22-100, Army Leadership: Be, Know, Do,
Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1999,
p. 5-14).

Figure 4. A Model Depicting the Influences
on Professional Behavior.
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Formal training is comprised of institutional training such as officer basic courses, advanced leadership
courses such as those provided by the U.S. Army War
College, and additional skill-qualification courses. Informal training is achieved by providing officers with
a career of worldwide operational assignments with
ever-increasing levels of authority and responsibility,
and the associated personnel policies that directly impact development such as the annual Officer Evaluation Reports, retirement incentives, and a “promote
or out” policy. Informal training also includes individual self-development such as an officer earning an
advanced degree on his or her own time, and mentoring programs where senior officers give career guidance and counseling to junior officers. Professional
development training programs are designed to impart the necessary managerial and leadership skills to
the officer corps so that these Army professionals will
routinely exhibit professional behavior and ultimately
providing strategic guidance and leadership for the
U.S. Army as a profession well into the future (FM 22100, 1999). Consequently, the adequate and appropriate development of Army professionals is a necessity
if the Army profession expects to obtain societal approbation for its legitimacy as the premier instrument
of American land warfare and to maintain its jurisdiction as such (Cook, 2002). Since organizational culture
pervades all that organizations do, it is logical that the
Army professional managerial/leadership skills that
were nurtured through the professional development
program have been influenced by the Army culture
(LeBoeuf, 2002). Therefore the next section outlines
the methodological procedures employed by this
study to identify the level of congruence between the
Army culture and the professional managerial/leadership skills of the Army’s senior leaders.
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METHODOLOGY
An Overview of the Competing Values Framework
(CVF) Model.
The CVF evolved from the work of Quinn and
Rohrbaugh (1981, 1983) as they attempted to circumscribe the elusive definition for a generally agreed
upon theoretical framework of the concept of organizational effectiveness. This framework was chosen
for this study because it was experimentally derived
and found to have a high degree of face and empirical
validity. Additionally, the CVF was identified as having a high level of reliability matching or exceeding
that of other instruments commonly used in the social
and organizational sciences (Cameron and Ettington,
1988; Cameron and Quinn, 1999; Berrio, 2003). The
four quadrants of the framework, representing the
four major cultural types: clan, adhocracy, market,
and hierarchy, provide a robust explanation of the
differing orientations and competing values that characterize human behavior. The richness provided by
the CVF is based on its ability to identify the basic assumptions, orientations, and values of each of the four
cultural types. These three elements comprise the core
of organizational culture. “The OCAI, therefore, is an
instrument that allows you to diagnose the dominant
orientation of your own organization based on these
core culture types. It also assists you in diagnosing
your organization’s cultural strength, cultural type,
and cultural congruence” (Cameron and Quinn, 1999,
p. 33). Through the use of the OCAI and its associated
MSAI, this study identifies the cultural type of the
U.S. Army, as defined by the study population, and
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the managerial/leadership skills of its senior leaders,
thereby establishing the level of congruence between
culture and professional development as depicted by
the building block model graphically portrayed in
Figure 4 above.
In their research concerning organizational effectiveness, Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1981, 1983) statistically analyzed 39 indicators of organizational
effectiveness as identified by Campbell et al., (1974).
Quinn and Rohrbaugh’s analysis resulted in the bifurcation of the 39 effectiveness criteria between two
major dimensions. The first dimension, which is labeled the “Structure” dimension, differentiates the
organizational effectiveness criteria between those
that emphasize flexibility, discretion, and dynamism
and those that emphasize stability, order, and control.
The second dimension, which is labeled the “Focus”
dimension, differentiates the organizational effectiveness criteria between those that emphasize internal
orientation, integration, and unity and those effectiveness criteria that emphasize an external orientation,
differentiation, and rivalry (Quinn and Rohrbaugh,
1981 and 1983; Cameron and Quinn, 1999). Within
each of these two dimensions there is also a third set
of values, which produces an emphasis ranging from
organizational processes, such as planning and goal
setting at one end of the spectrum, to an emphasis on
results, such as resource acquisition at the other end.
Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1981) labeled this third set of
values as the organizational “Means–Ends” continuum. The two primary dimensions differentiating between organizational values emphasizing “Structure”
and “Focus” produce four clusters of effectiveness
criteria as depicted in Figure 5. The “Structure” axis is
represented by the “Flexibility-Control” continuum,
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while the “Focus” axis in Figure 5 is represented by
the “People-Organization” continuum. Within each of
these four quadrants the relevant “Means-Ends” values are enumerated.

Figure 5. A Summary of the Competing Value Sets
and Effectiveness Models
(Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1981, p. 136).
Cameron and Quinn state that the significance of
these clusters of organizational effectiveness criteria
is that they “represent what people value about an organization’s performance. They define what is seen as
good right and appropriate . . . [and they] . . . define the
core values on which judgments about organizations
are made” (1999, p. 31). Additionally, these quadrants
represent opposite or competing values or assumptions. As you move, from left to right along the “Focus” (People-Organization) continuum or axis of the
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chart the emphasis shifts from an internal focus within the organization to that of an external focus outside
the organization. As you move from the bottom of the
chart along the “Structure” (Flexibility-Control) continuum or axis the emphasis shifts from control and
stability within the organization and the environment
to that of flexibility and discretion within the organization and the environment. The diagonal dimensions
also produce conflicting or competing values. For example, the values in the upper right quadrant emphasize an external focus concerned with flexibility and
growth, while the values in the lower left quadrant
accentuate an internal focus with control and stability
(Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983). Hence, the competing
or contradictory values in each quadrant form the basis for the “Competing Values Framework” name of
the conceptual model upon which the present study
is based.
In their initial study, Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1981)
also provided a brief review of four competing theoretical models of organizational effectiveness (Literature
discussing these four models can be found elsewhere:
Georgopoulos and Tannenbaum 1957; Lawrence
and Lorsch 1967; Thompson, 1967; Yuchtman and
Seashore, 1967; Mott, 1972; Price, 1972; Steers, 1975;
Campbell, 1977; Katz and Kahn 1978; Cameron and
Whetten, 1983; Pasmore, 1988; Anspach, 1991; Scott,
1992): the rational goal model, the open system model,
the human relations model, and the internal process
model, and they demonstrated how each of these
four models was related to the four quadrants of their
CVF model, see Figure 5. In their analyses, Quinn and
Rohrbaugh (1981, 1983) illustrate the importance that
the human relations model places on internal flexibility, cohesion, morale, and human resource develop-
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ment and correlate it to the upper left-hand quadrant
of their CVF model. The upper right-hand quadrant
of the CVF model is correlated with the open systems
model, which highlights the significance of external
flexibility, readiness, growth, and resource acquisition. The lower left-hand quadrant of the CVF model
is correlated with the internal process model, which
underscores the significance of internal control, stability, information management, and communication.
Finally, Quinn and Rohrbaugh state that the lower
right-hand quadrant of their CVF model is correlated
with the rational goal model, which underscores the
importance of external control, planning, goal setting,
productivity, and efficiency. Figure 5 provides a summary of the competing values sets and the four organizational effectiveness models. The significance of
these four quadrants is that they represent how “over
time, different organizational values have become associated with different forms of organization . . . [and
that] . . . each quadrant represents basic assumptions,
orientations, and values—the same elements that comprise an organizational culture” (Cameron and Quinn,
1999, pp. 32-33).
Origins of the Organizational Culture Assessment
Instrument (OCAI).
In 1985, Quinn and McGrath used the CVF model
of organizational effectiveness, outlined above, to develop their theory concerning the transformation of
organizational cultures. They stated that their study
was “interested in the contradiction, tension, and
paradox that leads to transformation” (1985, p. 315).
Specifically, they were attempting to develop an analytical scheme based on Janusian5 thinking (Rothen-
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berg, 1979), which “is a complex process in which
two apparently contradictory ideas or concepts are
conceived to be equally operative, therefore, paradoxical. It involves the generation of a simultaneous
antithesis, the integration of opposites” (Quinn and
McGrath, 1985, p. 316). This concept is analogous to
“double-loop learning” as described by Argyris and
Schon, who indicate that “[d]ouble-loop learning
changes the governing variables (the settings) of one’s
programs and causes ripples of change to fan out over
one’s whole system of theories-in-use” (1974, p. 19).
In other words, double-loop learning challenges an
organization’s past success and the basic norms, values, and assumptions that underlie that success by
continuously evaluating alternatives. As theorized
by Quinn and McGrath, such a continuous evaluation of organizational processes and behaviors will
eventually generate a shift (a transformation) of organizational culture. Consequently, their cultural transformation theory implies the simultaneous existence
of competing values within any organization; hence,
their preoccupation with contradiction and paradox
(Quinn and Cameron, 1988). This perspective helps to
explain why, as will be seen later, the OCAI identifies the relative preference and strength of competing
cultural types within organizations. In other words,
organizations have predominant cultural types, but
they also exhibit at the same time characteristics of the
other cultural types but to a lesser degree. Also, organizations may exhibit differing predominant cultural
types depending on a given situation in which the organization finds itself.
Using the existing scholarly literature explicating
different forms of organization, Quinn and McGrath
identified four main organizational forms, which
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they believe correlate with key management theories
concerning organizational success, leadership roles,
quality, and management skills (Cameron and Quinn,
1999). Consequently, they labeled these forms based
on the key characteristics of organizational values that
have over time become associated with these organizational forms, and they are: clan, adhocracy, hierarchy,
and market (see Table 2, Four Types of Organizational
Forms). Table 1, Transactional Expectations or Governing Rules, identifies the characteristics or profiles
of four transactional systems or cultural biases: Rational Culture, Ideological Culture, Consensual Culture, and Hierarchical Culture, which are deeply held
organizational values that determine identity, power,
and satisfaction within an organizational setting.
For example, in a rational culture, the organizational
purpose is the pursuit of objectives. In a hierarchical
culture, the organizational purpose is based on the
execution of regulations. Quinn and McGrath (1985)
found that these four transactional expectations were
related to the four types of organizational forms highlighted in Table 2. By reading down the columns, you
can see, for example, that the “Market” organizational
form is representative of a rational culture, and that
the “Adhocracy” organizational form is representative of an ideological culture, and so on. Cameron and
Quinn indicate that the four quadrants developed by
the CVF model matched “precisely the main organizational forms that have developed in organizational
science” (1999, p. 32), as identified by Quinn and McGrath in Tables 1 and 2. The resulting hybrid model
has become the foundation of Cameron and Quinn’s
(1999) OCAI see Figure 6.
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Transactional Expectations or Governing Rules
Rational
Culture

Ideological
Culture

Consensual
Culture

Hierarchical
Culture

Organizational
Purpose

pursuit of
objectives

broad purposes

group
maintenance

execution of
regulations

Criteria of
Performance

productivity,
efficiency

external support,
growth, resource
acquisition

cohesion,
morale

stability,
control

Location of
Authority

the boss

charisma

membership

rules

Base of Power

competence

values

informal
status

technical
knowledge

Decisionmaking

decisive
pronouncements

intuitive insights

participation

factual
analysis

Leadership Style

directive, goal
oriented

inventive, risk
oriented

concerned,
supportive

conservative,
cautious

Compliance

contractual
agreement

commitment to
values

commitment
from process

surveillance
and control

Evaluation of
Members

tangible output

intensity of effort

quality of
relationship

formal
criteria

Appropriate
Motives

achievement

growth

affiliation

security

Table 1. Transactional Expectations or
Governing Rules
from Quinn and McGrath, 1985, p. 327.
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Four Types of Organizational Forms
Market

Adhocracy

Clan

Hierarchy

Technology
(Perrow, 1967)

Engineering

Non-routine

Craft

Routine

Effectiveness
Model (Quinn and
Rohrbaugh, 1983)

Rational
Goal

Open
Systems

Human
Relations

Internal
Process

Strategic
Orientation (Miles
and Snow, 1978)

Analyzer

Prospector

Implementor

Defender

Type (Oliver,
1982)

Task

Professional

Group

Hierarchic

Illustration

Theory A

Stage II

Theory Z

Bureaucracy

Table 2. Four Types of Organizational Forms
from Quinn and McGrath, 1985, p. 327.
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Figure 6. The Competing Values of Leadership,
Effectiveness, and Organizational Theory
(Cameron & Quinn, 1999, p. 41).
Cameron and Quinn (1999) emphasize that each
of the four quadrants of the OCAI represents basic
assumptions, orientations, and values, which as the
literature review of this study has identified, represent the same elements that define organizational
culture. Figure 7 provides a detailed organizational
culture profile for each of the four dominant cultural
types as identified in Figure 6. Therefore, Cameron
and Quinn state that the OCAI “is an instrument that
allows you to diagnose the dominant orientation of
your own organization based on these core culture
types. It also assists you in diagnosing your organi-
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zation’s cultural strength, cultural type, and cultural
congruence” (1999, p. 33). Using the OCAI and its associated graph as depicted in Figure 9 (discussed in
the next section), cultural strength is determined by
the resulting score awarded to the four cultural types.
“The higher the score, the stronger or more dominant
is that particular culture” (Cameron and Quinn, 1999,
p. 63). Cultural type is determined by an OCAI profile
plot in the quadrant with the highest resulting score.
Finally, cultural congruence is determined by an analysis of the various components of an organization.
The Clan Culture.

The Adhocracy Culture.

A very friendly place to work where people
share a lot of themselves. It is like an extended
family. The leaders, or the heads of the organization, are considered to be mentors and
perhaps even parent figures. The organization
is held together by loyalty or tradition. Commitment is high. The organization emphasizes
the long-term benefit of human resources
development and attaches great importance
to cohesion and morale. Success is defined in
terms of sensitivity to customers and concern
for people. The organization places a premium
on teamwork, participation, and consensus.

A dynamic, entrepreneurial, and creative place
to work. People stick their necks out and take
risks. The leaders are considered innovators
and risk takers. The glue that holds the organizations together is commitment to experimention and innovation. The emphasis is on
being on the leading edge. The organization’s
long-term emphasis is on growth and acquiring
new resources. Success means gaining unique
and new products or services. Being a product
or service leader is important. The organization
encourages individual initiative and freedom.

The Hierarchy Culture.

The Market Culture.

A very formalized and structured place to work.
Procedures govern what people do. The leaders pride themselves on being good coordinators and organizaers who are efficiency-minded.
Maintaining a smooth-running organization is
most critical. Formal rules and policies hold the
organization together. The long-term concern
is on stability and performance with efficient,
smooth operations. Success is defined in terms
of dependable delivery, smooth scheduling,
and low cost. The management of employees
is concerned with secure employment and
predictability.

A results-oriented organization whose major
concern is with getting the job done. People are
competitive and goal-oriented. The leaders are
hard drivers, producers, and competitors. They
are tough and demanding. The glue that holds
the organization together is an emphasis on
winning. Reputation and success are common
concerns. The long-term focus is on competitive
actions and achievement of measurable goals
and targets. Success is defined in terms of
market share and penetration. Competitive pricing and market leadership are important. The
organization style is hard-driving competitiveness.

Figure 7. The Organizational Culture Profile
(Cameron & Quinn, 1999, p. 58).
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For example, if the marketing and sales divisions
of an organization both produce similar OCAI profile
plots then those two organizational sub-units are considered to have cultural congruence. In the case of the
Army profession, this study conducts a demographic
analysis to see if the various professional sub-components, i.e., branch, sex, source of commission, type of
student, etc., reflect organizational congruence or not.
The significance of organizational congruence is that
“[h]aving all aspects of the organization clear about
and focused on the same values and sharing the same
assumptions simply eliminates many of the complications, disconnects, and obstacles that can get in the
way of effective performance” (Cameron and Quinn,
1999, p. 64).
The OCAI uses an ipsative rating scale that requires
the respondent to “identify the trade-offs that actually
exist in the organization” (Cameron and Quinn, 1999,
p. 144). In other words, the ipsative scale allows the respondent to identify the simultaneous existence of the
preference for different cultural types. This implies,
as indicated in the literature, that a variety of cultural
types (competing values) may exist in each organization, but to different degrees or strength. In short,
each organization will have a unique cultural profile.
The ipsative scale allows the respondent to differentiate between four different alternative responses to a
given question by assigning a relative percentage to
each of the alternatives. The percentages given to all
four alternative responses must total 100, thereby allowing the respondent to indicate the cultural type
and strength that exists within their organization. See
Appendix A for copy of the OCAI used in the present
study.
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An Overview of the Management Skills
Assessment Instrument (MSAI).
Cameron and Quinn developed the MSAI using
the same framework as that of the OCAI in order to
help managers and leaders identify the necessary
skills and competencies that they must either develop or improve to facilitate an organizational culture
change effort. The MSAI can also be used to enhance
leadership abilities to improve organizational performance within the context of a current culture if a
cultural change is not necessary. Based on an analysis
of 15 studies, which researched the managerial leadership skills characteristic of a number of highly effective managers and organizations worldwide, Whetten
and Cameron (1998) interviewed over 400 top executives to identify which skills were most important for
individual leadership success (Cameron and Quinn,
1999). Cameron and Quinn consolidated the resulting list of successful leadership skills into a set of 12
competency categories which are mainly applicable to
mid-level and upper-level managers (1999). See Figure 8 for the 12 competency categories and their associated primary OCAI category. Table 3 provides a
detailed list of the 12 critical managerial competency
categories and a brief description of the individual
characteristics, which comprise these categories.
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Figure 8. A Model of the 12 Critical
Managerial Competencies and their Related
CVF Cultural Types
(Cameron and Quinn, 1999, p. 108).
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The 12 Competency Categories
CLAN QUADRANT

CHARACTERISTICS

Managing Teams (MT)

Facilitating effective, cohesive, smooth functioning, high performance
teamwork

Managing Interpersonal
Relationships (MIR)

Facilitating effective interpersonal relationships including supportive
feedback, listening, and resolution of interpersonal problems

Managing the
Development of Others
(MD)

Helping individuals improve their performance, expand their
competencies, and obtain personal development opportunities

ADHOCRACY QUADRANT
Managing Innovation (MI)

Encouraging individuals to innovate, expand alternatives, become
more creative, and facilitate new idea generation

Managing the Future (MF)

Communicating a clear vision of the future and facilitating its
accomplishment

Managing Continuous
Improvement (MCI)

Fostering an orientation toward continuous improvement, flexibility,
and productive change among individuals in their work life

MARKET QUADRANT
Managing Competitiveness
(MC)

Fostering competitive capabilities and an aggressive orientation
toward exceeding competitors’ performance

Energizing Employees (EE)

Motivating and inspiring individuals to be proactive, to put forth extra
effort, and to work vigorously

Managing Customer
Service (MCS)

Fostering an orientation toward serving customers, involving them,
and exceeding their expectations

HIERARCHY QUADRANT
Managing Acculturation
(MA)

Helping individuals become clear about what is expected of them,
what the culture and standards of the organization are, and how they
can best fit into the work setting

Managing the Control
System (MCS)

Ensuring that procedures, measurements, and monitoring systems
are in place to keep processes and performance under control

Managing Coordination
(MCo)

Fostering coordination within the organization as well as with external
units and managers, and sharing information across boundaries

Table 3. The 12 Critical Managerial
Competency Categories
and Their Associated Characteristics
(Cameron and Quinn, 1999, pp. 108—109).
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The 12 Competency Categories
CLAN QUADRANT

MSAI Question Numbers

Managing Teams

12, 18, 21, 22, 49, 61, 76

Managing Interpersonal Relationships

1, 13, 23, 48, 50, 62, 77

Managing the Development of Others

5, 20, 24, 25, 47, 63, 78

ADHOCRACY QUADRANT
Managing Innovation

2, 8, 9, 26, 51, 64, 79

Managing the Future

14, 27, 28, 45, 46, 65, 80

Managing Continuous Improvement

29, 44, 52, 53, 59, 66, 81

MARKET QUANDRANT
Managing Competitiveness

15, 30, 35, 43, 60, 67, 82

Energizing Employees

3, 6, 7, 31, 42, 68, 83

Managing Customer Service

32, 33, 41, 54, 55, 69, 84

HIERARCHY QUADRANT
Managing Acculturation

10, 11, 34, 40, 56, 70, 85

Managing the Control System

4, 16, 19, 36, 39, 71, 86

Managing Coordination

17, 37, 38, 57, 58, 72, 87

Table 4. The 12 Critical Managerial
Competency Categories
and Their Associated MSAI Questions
(Cameron and Quinn, 1999).
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Methodology of the Study.
As stated at the beginning of this monograph, the
primary research question of this study is: Is the organizational culture of the U.S. Army congruent with
the professional development of its senior level officer corps?
The present study is based upon a quantitative
evaluation of the current and preferred culture of the
U.S. Army as identified by its senior level leaders.
For the purpose of this study, the study population
is defined as all U.S. Army lieutenant colonels and
colonels who were actively enrolled as students of the
U.S. Army War College Master of Strategic Studies
program, Classes of 2003 and 2004 as of May 1, 2003.
These individuals were chosen as the study population because they were previously identified by competitive U.S. Army evaluation boards as having highly
successful command and leadership careers and as
having the greatest potential for advancement. Collectively, senior service college graduates, such as these
cohorts from the U.S. Army War College represent the
pool of officers from which the future strategic leaders of the U.S. Army will be selected. Once selected
for promotion to general officer, these officers will be
charged with shaping the future culture of the U.S.
Army and with adequately posturing the Army as an
organization and as a profession for successful performance in a highly turbulent national security environment (Magee and Somervell, 1998).
The purpose of the present study is to explore the
relationship between organizational culture and professional development and to extend current theory
and empirical knowledge concerning this relationship.
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These objectives will be accomplished by answering
the primary research question through an analysis of
four related hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: The current organizational culture
of the U.S. Army is not consistent with an organizational culture supportive of professional development.
To address the first hypothesis, a quantitative survey instrument, the OCAI, was administered to 952
U.S. Army War College students as described above.
For the purposes of this study and in accordance with
Schein’s (1992) model, the concept of organizational
culture is conceptualized as having three levels: artifacts, values, and deep basic underlying assumptions,
see Figure 2. Additionally, this study supports the
Competing Values Framework (CVF) as identified
and described by Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1981, 1983)
earlier in this monograph. The CVF approach has been
identified as being highly successful as an “underlying framework, a theoretical foundation that can narrow and focus the search for key cultural dimensions”
(Cameron and Quinn, 1999, p. 29). The Organizational
Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI), as established by Cameron and Quinn (1999) and as outlined
earlier in this study, is used to operationalize the concept of organizational culture as defined by the CVF.
The type of culture as identified by the respondents
for both the “Now” and “Preferred” cultures will be
plotted on the CVF graph as developed by Cameron
and Quinn (1999) and as portrayed in the following
sample plot in Figure 9.
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Figure 9. Overall Culture of Sample Organization.
Note: Figure 9 is a graphic representation of the overall culture of “Sample Organization” based on “Now” (solid line) and
“Preferred” (dotted line) Respondent Ratings on the OCAI. This
plot indicates this organization’s cultural archetype is relatively
balanced, with the exception of a lower rating in the adhocracy
cultural type. Note the preferred ratings clearly indicate that
“clan” is the desired culture type (Sample is adapted from Cameron and Quinn, 1999, p. 97).

Professional development is normatively conceptualized by the U.S. Army as the process whereby the
leaders of tomorrow are identified, trained, developed, and assigned to increasingly responsible duty
positions for the purpose of being prepared to perform
duties at the highest levels of the organization. Additionally, the concept of professional development
includes the advancement of those skills that support
innovative, flexible, risk-taking, visionary, and entre62

preneurial behavior (Argyris and Schon, 1974; Schon,
1983; Mosher, 1982; Huntington, 1985; Freidson, 1986;
Senge, 1994; Martin and McCausland, 2002; Wong,
2002; Snider, 2003, 2003a).
For the purposes of this study, a culture that is
supportive of professional development is operationalized as being reflective of the “adhocracy” cultural
type as indicated by the results of the OCAI on either
the “Now” or “Preferred” ratings. As indicated in Hypothesis 1 it is anticipated that the “Now” plot for the
study population of this study will not reflect an adhocracy cultural type for the U.S. Army. Additionally,
the operationalization of the concept of professional
development will be accomplished through the use
of Cameron and Quinn’s MSAI, which is specifically
pertinent to Hypothesis 4.
Hypothesis 2: The current organizational culture
of the U.S. Army is consistent with that of a hierarchical/bureaucratic organization.
The U.S. Army’s Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP, 2001) concluded that the gap between the Army’s professed ideals and its actual practices in the areas of training and leader development
has spread outside the officer corps’ “band of tolerance.” What this means is that the difference between
the Army profession’s “espoused values,” those that
they publicly promulgate as organizational principles,
and the Army profession’s “theories-in-use,” those
values that actually guide behavior, (Argyris, 1976;
Argyris and Schon, 1974) are no longer in agreement
with each other. Snider and Watkins emphasize the
significance of this discrepancy by stating that “[f]rom
the members of the Army officer corps, as the commissioned agents of the American people responsible for
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the continued stewardship of the profession and for
the development of the sons and daughters of America who serve in it, more is expected, legally and morally” (2002, p. 16). The principal thesis of their work
is that since “the continual development of military
expertise and effective control of an Army operationally engaged on behalf of American society are both
essential to the nation’s future security, a nonprofessional Army is certainly not in America’s best interest”
(2002, p. 12). Schon reiterates the need for professional
organizations to renew their essence as a profession
by being reflective-in-action and by avoiding the pitfalls of embedded organizational knowledge. In other
words, successful practices from the past must be
continuously challenged, evaluated, and if necessary
changed, to ensure success in the future. Consequently, Hypothesis 2 suggests that the current culture of
the U.S. Army as indicated by the “Now” plot on the
OCAI chart will reflect the hierarchy cultural type. If
this is found to be the case, the CVF model indicates
that a plot in the Hierarchy quadrant is the antithesis
of the adhocracy cultural type, which is the theoretically preferred dominant cultural type for professional organizations as the literature review of this study
has demonstrated. See Figure 9 for an example of a
“Now” plot on the OCAI chart.
Hypothesis 3: The preferred culture of the U.S.
Army is consistent with organizational cultures supportive of innovative, risk-taking, boundary spanning, demanding continuous improvement, reflective-in-action, dynamic, and adaptive behavior.
A review of several significant U.S. Army leadership publications indicates that the Army is acutely
aware of the type of values, practical professional
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skills, and behavior that are necessary for its senior
and strategic level leaders to exhibit for the Army as
a profession to be successful well into the future (AR
600-100, 1993; FM 22-100, 1999; Magee and Somervell,
1998; FM 6-22, 2006). Argyris and Schon (1974) state
that “espoused values” are those values that individuals and organizations give allegiance to and communicate to others. Therefore, it is expected that the
first two hypotheses will indicate that the U.S. Army’s
culture is not consistent with that of professional organizations as operationalized by the adhocracy cultural type of the OCAI. Assuming that Hypotheses 1
and 2 are not rejected, therefore providing empirical
support indicating that the study population of Army
senior leaders perceives the Army’s current culture
as being indicative of a hierarchical organization,
Hypothesis 3 postulates that the study population
of Army senior leaders also realizes how the culture
must be transformed to achieve greater organizational
performance, success, and survival (Brown and Dodd,
1998; Berrio, 2003). Hypothesis 3 is validated through
the “Preferred” plot of the OCAI, which is intended to
be an instrument that enables organizational leaders
to determine the direction in which cultural change efforts should be directed (Cameron and Quinn, 1999).
Cameron and Quinn state that:
A common mistake in organizations desiring to improve is that they do not take the time to create a common viewpoint among employees about where the
organization is starting [the “Now” cultural plot of
the OCAI] and where it needs to go [the “Preferred”
cultural plot of the OCAI]. Unsuccessful organizations
often launch right into a new change program without
considering the need to develop a consensual view
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of the current culture, the need to reach consensus of
what change means and doesn’t mean, and the specific
changes that will be started, stopped, and continued
(1999, p. 92).

Consequently, it is postulated that the preferred
culture of the U.S. Army, as perceived by the study
population and as indicated by the “Preferred” plot
on the OCAI chart, will be representative of the ahocracy cultural type, which is the antithesis of the hierarchical cultural type, and is the direction in which
the Army senior leaders believe that the Army profession must be moved to guarantee future success. See
Figure 9 for an example of a “Preferred” plot on the
OCAI chart. As discussed previously, adhocracy cultures are characterized by dynamic, entrepreneurial,
creative, risk-taking, and innovative behavior that is
dedicated to the long-term emphasis of acquiring new
knowledge and practical skills (Cameron and Quinn,
1999). Hierarchical cultures are characterized as being formalized organizational structures, with an emphasis on formal rules and policies, and a long-term
commitment to stability, and efficient smooth performance (Cameron and Quinn, 1999). It is anticipated
that a “Preferred” plot in the adhocracy quadrant is
significant for several reasons. First, it indicates that
what the Army’s senior leaders say they will do in a
given situation is different than what they will actually do in practice (Argyris and Schon, 1974; Schein,
1985; CSIS, 2000; Watkins and Cohen, 2002). Second,
a “Preferred” plot in the adhocracy quadrant would
indicate that the study population of U.S. Army senior
leaders perceives that the current culture of the U.S.
Army is not consistent with the type of culture that
is supportive of innovative, adaptive, dynamic, flex-
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ible, or forward-looking behavior. This would indicate that the Army’s culture is out of congruence with
the national security environment of the 21st century,
which is characterized by volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (Magee and Somervell, 1998).
Finally, if this hypothesis is not rejected, it implies that
the potential for a successful cultural intervention is
good because the espoused values of the study population of U.S. Army senior leaders are at least consistent with the cultural type most representative of a
professional organization and that there is a level of
consensus among those who will be responsible in the
near future to facilitate that change. Consequently, a
“Preferred” plot in the adhocracy quadrant demonstrates an appreciation for innovative behavior and a
willingness on the part of the Army’s future leaders to
embark upon a cultural change effort that would be
meaningless without senior leader commitment.
Hypothesis 4: The individual professional skills
of the U.S. Army senior level officer corps are not
characterized by innovative, risk-taking, boundary
spanning, demanding continuous improvement, reflective-in-action, dynamic, and adaptive behavior.
Leader development is an essential component of
organizational performance and organizational survival, especially for that of a professional organization
(Argyris and Schon, 1974, Schon, 1983; Huntington,
1985; Abbott, 1988; CSIS, 2000; Snider and Watkins,
2002; Martin and McCausland, 2002; Snider, 2003a;
Gordon and Sollinger, 2004). As indicated above, and
for the purposes of this study, professional development is a process whereby the leaders of tomorrow
are identified and prepared to be capable of perform-
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ing duties at the highest levels of the organization as
their career progresses.
The operationalization of the concept of professional development will be accomplished through
the use of Cameron and Quinn’s MSAI as outlined in
detail earlier in this study. The 12 critical managerial
competencies for the study population of Army senior
leaders, as identified by the MSAI, will be plotted on a
chart similar to the OCAI, see Figure 10.

Figure 10. Management Skills Profile Plotting Chart
(Adapted from Cameron and Quinn, 1999, p. 207).
Hypothesis 4 suggests that the resulting data as
depicted by an MSAI plot will not reflect scores that
are consistent with the three critical managerial competencies associated with the Adhocracy quadrant of
the OCAI: Managing Innovation, Managing the Fu-
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ture, and Managing Continuous Improvement (see
Figure 10). If this hypothesis is not rejected, then this
analysis provides empirical data suggesting that there
is a positive correlation between the Army’s existing
culture and the type of professional skills that are produced by its professional development training program. It is expected that the respondent scores will be
reflective of the three critical managerial competencies
associated with the hierarchical cultural type: Managing Coordination, Managing the Control System, and
Managing Acculturation, because it is also hypothesized that the hierarchical cultural type will be reflected by the OCAI as the dominant cultural type as
identified by the study population.
Additional Analysis. Analysis of variance (ANOVA)
procedures will be used to conduct an in-depth evaluation of the survey instrument response data. Specifically, an evaluation will be conducted to determine if
there are any statistically significant differences between the branches of the Army profession (infantry,
armor, artillery, etc.), between the three components
of the Army profession (active duty, Army National
Guard, and Army Reserve), and between key demographic information (sex, rank, age, source of commission, resident student, or distance education student,
etc.). See the “Demographic Information” portion of
the MSAI at Appendix B. This analysis will help to determine if there is a homogeneous professional Army
culture.
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) of the demographic data provided by the respondents will provide some indication of the impact that sub-cultural
influence may have on a homogeneous Army culture.
For example, do infantry officers perceive the cultural
type to be different than do medical corps officers? Do
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women officers perceive the cultural type to be different than do male officers? From a practical perspective
it is theorized that if a homogeneous culture does exist within the senior level officer corps, even if those
values are not congruent with that of a professional
organization, then the potential for a successful cultural intervention is favorable. If it is determined that
the Army officer corps is comprised of numerous subcultures whose values and basic underlying assumptions are dramatically different from one another, a
cultural intervention would be far more difficult. This
difficulty would arise because of the necessity to diagnose the specifics of the underlying differences and
to develop a change strategy that addresses each of
these differences, as opposed to changing one relatively homogeneous culture. It is interesting to note
that Gailbreath et al., in their study using the MyersBriggs Type Indicator (MBTI), concluded that “in the
Army, as in some other organizations, forces toward
homogeneity have created limited diversity in top
management” (1997, p. 229). The negative aspect of
behavioral homogeneity is that the behavioral flexibility of a profession’s senior leaders is restricted and
as a result organizational effectiveness suffers (Gailbreath et al., 1997; Kirkpatrick and Locke, 1991). Consequently, if a homogeneous culture is desired, it is
important to emphasize the development of a culture
that has reflexive thinking as a core value and a basic underlying assumption. For the purposes of this
study, it is hypothesized that the adhocracy cultural
type, as identified by the OCAI, is a culture type that
is supportive of continuous improvement and reflexive thinking and is most representative of professional
organizations, to include the officer corps of the U.S.
Army who represent the Army profession.
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FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
As indicated in the introduction and methodology
sections of this monograph, four classes of U.S. Army
War College6, Master of Strategic Studies degree program students were given an anonymous opportunity
to complete the Organizational Culture Assessment
Instrument (OCAI) and the Management (Leadership) Skills Assessment Instrument (MSAI). The study
population of U.S. Army officers in these four classes
consisted of 952 students (N=952). From this study
population, a total of 533 (n=533) survey instruments
were returned for a response rate of 56 percent. There
were no unusable survey responses returned. The demographics of the respondent population (n=533) are
virtually identical to the study population (N=952).
This finding is not surprising due to the relatively
high response rate of 56 percent. For example, males
comprise 93 percent of the study population and 87.8
percent of the respondent population. Infantry officers comprise 13.2 percent of the study population
and 13.1 percent of the respondent population, and as
a final example, Caucasian officers comprise 84.6 percent of the study population and 87.6 percent of the
respondent population. Table 5 provides a detailed
demographic summary of the parameters of the 952
students in the study population and the statistics of
the 533 survey respondents. A close inspection of this
data reveals that in all categories the respondent population is nearly identical to that of the study population.
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Percent
of Study
Population

Respondents

Percent of
Respondents

885

93.0

468

87.8

67

7.0

65

12.2

30 & Under

0

0.0

0

0.0

31-35

1

0.1

1

0.2

36-38

1

0.1

0

0.0

Demographics

Study
Population

Sex
Male
Female
Age

39-41

38

4.0

47

8.8

42-44

277

29.1

185

34.7

45-47

345

36.2

170

31.9

48-50

146

15.3

66

12.4

Over 50

143

15.0

64

12.0

403

42.3

196

36.8

549

57.7

337

63.2

Air Defense

19

2.0

8

1.5

Adjutant General

31

3.3

17

3.2

Army Nurse

12

1.3

10

1.9

Armor

71

7.5

49

9.2

Aviation

70

7.4

32

6.0

Civil Affairs

35

3.7

18

3.4

Chaplain

28

2.9

15

2.8

Chemical

18

1.9

11

2.1

7

0.7

4

0.8

84

8.8

53

9.9

Rank
COL
LTC
Branch

Dental
Engineers

Table 5. Demographics of the Study and
Respondent Populations.
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Demographics
Continued

Study
Population

Percent
of Study
Population

Respondents

Percent of
Respondents

8.9

51

9.6

Branch
Continued
Field Artillery

85

Finance

9

0.9

8

1.5

Infantry

126

13.2

70

13.1

Judge Advocate

28

2.9

10

1.9

Medical Corps

17

1.8

14

2.6

Military Intelligence

47

4.9

25

4.7

Military Police

25

2.6

13

2.4

Medical Services

17

1.8

12

2.3

Ordnance

35

3.7

20

3.8

Quartermaster

48

5.0

32

6.0

Signal

52

5.5

24

4.5

Special Forces

21

2.2

13

2.4

Transportation

44

4.6

21

3.9

Veterinary

8

0.8

3

0.6

15

1.6

0

0.0

Military Academy

121

12.7

71

13.3

ROTC

536

56.3

310

58.2

OCS

136

14.3

97

18.2

Direct Commission

82

8.6

49

9.2

Other

77

8.1

6

1.1

Other
Source of Commission

Ethnicity
Caucasian

805

84.6

467

87.6

African American

64

6.7

35

6.6

Latino

25

2.6

11

2.1

No Data

No Data

3

0.6

Asian

10

1.5

7

1.3

Other

48

5.0

10

1.9

South Pacific Islander

Table 5. Continued.
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Demographics
Continued

Study
Population

Percent
of Study
Population

Respondents

Percent of
Respondents

Component
Active Army

447

47.0

227

42.6

USAR

266

28.0

126

23.6

No Data

No Data

39

7.3

239

25.1

105

19.7

No Data

No Data

36

6.8

2003

474

49.8

235

44.1

2004

478

50.2

298

55.9

Resident

428

45.0

204

38.3

Distance Education

524

55.0

329

61.7

Bachelors

252

26.5

119

22.3

Masters

572

60.1

351

65.9

Doctorate

128

13.4

63

11.8

USAR Title 10
ARNG
ARNG Title 10 & 32
USAWC Class

Type of USAWC
Student

Level of Education

Table 5. Continued.
Since it is the intention of this monograph to generalize its findings to that of the larger study population,
the representativeness of the respondents, as reflected
by the demographic data provided above, is noteworthy. However, it is important to state at this time that
the findings of this monograph are not intended to
be representative of all U.S. Army lieutenant colonels
and colonels. As indicated in the introduction and
methodology sections, these lieutenant colonels and
colonels were chosen as the study population because
they were previously identified by competitive U.S.
Army evaluation boards as having highly successful

74

command and leadership careers and as having the
greatest potential for advancement. Consequently,
they have already been distinguished as not being
representative of all U.S. Army lieutenant colonels
and colonels. Collectively, senior service college graduates, such as these cohorts from the U.S. Army War
College represent the pool of officers from which the
future strategic leaders, general officers, of the U.S.
Army will be selected. By definition then, these 533
respondents can be considered representative of the
future leaders of the U.S. Army. That is why their collective perceptions of the Army’s professional culture
and of their own managerial/leadership skills are of
such significance to this study.
Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument
(OCAI): Findings and Analysis.
OCAI/MSAI Reliability Tests. Data supporting the
validity and reliability of the OCAI and MSAI survey
instruments are well-established (Berrio, 2003). However, this study also conducted reliability tests using
Cronbach’s alpha, which is a satisfactory statistic to
determine if the respondents of the study population
of the Army’s senior leaders rated the Army profession’s culture consistently across all of the different
questions used by the two survey instruments. The
results of these tests demonstrate strong internal reliability and are very consistent with previous results.
The reliability coefficients for the OCAI are summarized in Table 6 and in Table 7 for the MSAI.
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Culture Type

Reliability
Coefficients
“Now”

Reliability
Coefficients
“Preferred”

Comparison Reliability Coefficients

*1

*2

*3

*4

*5

Clan

.77

.76

.74

.79

.82

.80

.77

Adhocracy

.68

.76

.79

.80

.83

.75

.72

Market

.74

.74

.71

.77

.78

.90

.84

Hierarchy

.69

.66

.73

.76

.67

.62

.79

*1–Quinn and Spreitzer, 1991; *2–Yeung et al., 1991; *3–Zammuto and Krakower, 1991;
*4–Berrio, 2003; *5–Berrio, 2003.

Table 6. OCAI Reliability Coefficients
Using Cronbach’s Alpha Methodology.
MSAI Reliability Coefficients for the 12 Competency Categories
(See Table 3)
Culture Type

Clan
Adhocracy

MT

MIR MD

.73

.72 .78

MI

MF MCI MC

.79

.83

Market

MCS MA MCS MCo

.73

.81

.79
.82

Hierarchy

EE

.73 .78

Table 7. MSAI Reliability Coefficients
Using Cronbach’s Alpha Methodology.
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.76

As indicated in Table 6, Cronbach’s alpha was
used to determine the reliability coefficients for both
the OCAI “Now” and “Preferred” series of questions,
and these reliability scores are listed for each cultural
type in their respective column. Additionally, Table 6
also provides comparative reliability coefficients from
five previous studies. The results of this study are very
consistent with the previous data and provide strong
support for Cameron and Quinn’s (1999) assertion
that the OCAI is a reliable instrument that measures
culture types consistently.
Table 7 provides Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficients for the 12 MSAI competency categories as reported in the Methodology section of this monograph.
As a review, the three competency categories for the
Clan culture type are: Managing Teams (MT), Managing Interpersonal Relationships (MIR), and Managing
the Development of Others (MD). The three competency categories for the Adhocracy culture type are:
Managing Innovation (MI), Managing the Future (MF),
and Managing Continuous Improvement (MCI). The
three competency categories for the Market culture
type are: Managing Competitiveness (MC), Energizing Employees (EE), and Managing Customer Service
(MCS). Finally, the three competency categories for
the Hierarchy culture type are: Managing Acculturation (MA), Managing the Control System (MCS), and
Managing Coordination (MCo). Just like the results
for the OCAI, the MSAI reliability coefficients strongly support Cameron and Quinn’s (1999) contention
that the MSAI is a reliable instrument that measures
the strength and weakness of managerial/leadership
skills within the four predominant culture types consistently. In conclusion, we can reasonably assume
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that the questions that comprise the OCAI and the
MSAI are, to at least some strong degree, measuring
what each purports to measure, that is, culture type
and managerial and leadership skills respectively.
Analysis of the Research Hypotheses. The principal
purpose for this study was to answer the following
primary research question: Is the organizational culture of the U.S. Army congruent with the professional development of its senior level officer corps? In
order to answer this question, four research hypotheses were empirically tested to determine the degree
of congruence between the U.S. Army culture and the
professional development of its senior leaders.
Testing of Hypothesis 1: Hypothesis 1 postulates
that the current culture of the U.S. Army is not consistent with organizational cultures supportive of
professional development. As discussed earlier, the
existing literature strongly suggests that the “adhocracy” culture type is the culture type, as identified by
the Competing Values Framework (CVF) (Quinn and
Rohrbaugh, 1983), that is representative of organizational cultures supportive of professional behavior,
and that such professional behavior can be characterized as adaptive, innovative, flexible, dynamic, and
entrepreneurial. Consequently, Hypothesis 1 assumes
that when the OCAI data values for the current culture
of the U.S. Army are plotted on an OCAI profile chart
that the predominant culture type will not be plotted
in the Adhocracy quadrant.
Figure 11 depicts the U.S. Army’s current (“Now”)
organizational culture archetype, as identified by the
533 (n=533) respondents to this study, as clearly falling into the Market quadrant; the solid lines forming a
diamond shape in the graph. The mean scores for each
quadrant are: 37.95 for the Market quadrant, 28.84 for
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the Hierarchy quadrant, 21.17 for the Clan quadrant,
and 11.77 for the Adhocracy quadrant. Therefore,
Hypothesis 1 is not rejected because the current U.S.
Army culture profile did not fall into the Adhocracy
quadrant. This is a significant finding because organization’s whose organizational culture can be characterized as “market” cultures are defined as being
results-oriented, competitive, goal-oriented, tough
and demanding, with an emphasis on winning. “The
organizational style is hard-driving competitiveness
(Cameron and Quinn, 1999, p. 122).” During the initial analysis this finding was somewhat of a surprise.
Based on the present researcher’s 30 year career as an
Army officer and as an Army civilian and extensive
research with this subject matter the expectation was
that the current U.S. Army culture would fall into the
Hierarchy quadrant, which is the assumption of Hypothesis 2. Hierarchical cultures are characterized as
being formalized and structured, with and emphasis
on formal rules and policies that hold the organization
together (Cameron and Quinn, 1999). Hierarchical
leaders are proud of being efficient coordinators and
organizers. It is no surprise to most organizational
theorists that the military has been described as being
the model of a rigid hierarchical organization (White,
1997). It is interesting to note that the second highest
score given by the U.S. Army respondents for the U.S.
Army’s current culture was plotted in the Hierarchy
quadrant, with the third highest score being plotted
in the Clan quadrant and the lowest score in the Adhocracy quadrant. The magnitude of the ratings in the
Hierarchy and Market quadrants is quite large and
indicates the relative cultural strength. The “market”
rating is nearly four times greater than the “adhocracy” rating and the “hierarchy’ rating is nearly three
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times greater than the “adhocracy” rating. What the
data tell us is that the future senior leaders of the U.S.
Army profession clearly perceive that the deep-seated
underlying assumptions that comprise the Army culture are focused on organizational stability and control as opposed to innovation, flexibility, and longterm growth.

Figure 11. OCAI Profile Chart for the
“Now” U.S. Army Culture.
An ANOVA procedure was conducted across all
demographic categories to determine if there were
any statistically significant differences in the mean
scores of these various demographics. There were no
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statistically significant differences (p≤.05) between
respondent’s rank, branch, source of commission,
ethnicity, War College class, and type of War College
student. There was a statistically significant finding
(p≤.05) that females rated the current culture as lower
in the Clan and Adhocracy quadrants and higher in
the Market quadrant than did male officers. There
was also a statistically significant finding (p≤.05) that
officers over 50 years of age found the current culture
as being less competitive than did younger officers.
Additionally, there was a statistically significant finding (p≤.05) that active duty Army officers perceived
the Army culture as being more competitive than did
reserve component officers. Finally, there was a statistically significant finding (p≤.05) that Army officers
with a doctoral degree perceived the Army culture as
being more hierarchical than did other officers.
It is not surprising that those female U.S. Army officers who participated in this study do not find the
current U.S. Army culture as friendly and as entrepreneurial as do their male counterparts. Females still
experience some degree of gender discrimination in
the U.S. Army, and in the military in general, as they
do throughout society. Additionally, the U.S. military
still prohibits women from entering into a number of
military occupational specialties which involve direct
ground combat, and which are perceived as being the
technical core of the Army profession. Consequently,
women perceive a greater level of competition with
their male counterparts and they also believe that they
must work harder than do their male counterparts
to earn the same level of respect. These perceptions
are consistent with the findings of the CSIS report on
American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century
(2000).
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The finding that officers over 50 years of age perceive the current culture as being less competitive than
do younger officers is also not particularly surprising.
Most of these officers are in the twilight of their military careers and are nearing the 30-year mandatory
retirement limitation for active duty officers, and the
mandatory retirement date for reserve officers. Consequently, it is assumed that they realize that there are
few promotion opportunities ahead of them and that
they have probably attained the highest rank that they
will achieve.
It is postulated that the active duty officers perceive
the Army culture as being more competitive because
of the demanding “up or out” policy employed by all
of the military services since 1947 (Crawley, 2004). Active duty Army officers are constantly competing with
their peers for career enhancing schools, duty assignments such as being a unit commander, and secondary
career specialties, all of which are normally required
to be accomplished by specified time periods during
which various cohorts of officers are considered for
promotion. While the standards for promotion are essentially the same for reserve officers the time period
constraint as exemplified by active duty promotion
boards is not the same or as critical for reserve officers and therefore a reserve officer can be retained in
their current rank for much longer periods of time between promotions. Additionally, reserve officers tend
to be assigned to a specific unit, usually in the community for which they are a native, for many years
as opposed to the months or year or two that active
duty officers are assigned. Consequently, the underlying culture of competitiveness, as indicated by this
study, is not as prevalent for reserve officers as it is for
their active duty counterparts. It is interesting to note
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that in 2004 the Department of Defense discussed a
limited test for a new officer personnel management
policy that would eliminate the “up or out” strategy
and change it to a “perform or out” policy (Crawley,
2004). This proposal addressed the promotion time
period issue and would allow military professionals
to focus on their own individual performance instead
of constantly jockeying and competing for the right
duty assignment or school “that serve as promotion
and command qualification gates rather than opportunities to complete significant developmental experiences based on articulated standards” (LeBoeuf, 2002,
p. 495).
The final statistically significant difference indicated by the ANOVA procedures for Hypothesis 1,
which indicated that Ph.D.s perceive the Army culture as being more hierarchical than did the remaining officers, is not surprising. Berrio (2003) reported
that the prevailing culture of the Ohio State University Extension was a Clan type culture, and Paparone
(2003) reported that the dominant culture of the research institute of military senior service college was
an Adhocracy type culture. Both of these institutions
are predominantly populated by Ph.D.s who value an
emphasis on flexibility and discretion and who direct
their energies toward the expansion of their esoteric
professional knowledge base. Due to their extensive
level of education and autonomous research capabilities and preferences, the formalized competitive
structure of the U.S. Army is considered to be overly
restrictive by the Army professionals with Ph.D.s. It
is not surprising that they are more opposed to the
bureaucratic desire for stability and control of hierarchical cultures than are the remainder of their officer
peers (Paparone, 2003).
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In summary, this study found that the dominant
organizational culture type and strength, as indicated
by the direction and magnitude of the various quadrant scores, of the U.S. Army profession is strongly
supportive of stability and control. The Army professional culture can be characterized by an emphasis on
hard-driving competitiveness situated in a very formalized and structured place of work.
Testing of Hypothesis 2: Hypothesis 2 is essentially an extension of Hypothesis 1. To some extent,
the results have already been discussed in the review
of the findings for Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 2 takes
Hypothesis 1 one step further by postulating that the
current dominant culture of the Army profession, as
perceived by the 533 respondents (n=533) will fall into
the Hierarchy quadrant. As indicated above, this hypothesis should be rejected, at least on a superficial
level, since the score obtained for the Hierarchy quadrant was the second highest score and not the highest
score. However, as indicated in the Competing Values
Framework (CVF) (Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983) organizations can possess competing cultural values at
various times or in various sub-units of the organization. The ANOVA procedures outlined in the previous section indicate that there is a clear belief among
all ten demographic categories of the Army senior
leaders in this study that the dominant Army cultural
type falls in the Market quadrant with the Hierarchy
culture type coming in a strong second. The reason
that this hypothesis should not be categorically dismissed even though the data do not directly support
its premise is that both the “market” and the “hierarchy” cultural types fall below the “internal—external
focus” axis which indicates that the Army profession
is strongly supportive of stability and control and
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can be characterized by an emphasis on hard-driving
competitiveness and as a very formalized and structured place to work. The combined ipsative score for
the Market and Hierarchy quadrants is 66.79, which
is double the combined score of 32.94 for the Clan and
Adhocracy quadrants. Consequently, the total OCAI
results are highly informative in that they provide a
strong indication that the characteristics of the Army
professional culture are not supportive of professional behavior or long-term environmental adaptability, flexibility, and innovation (Freidson, 1970, 1986;
Mosher, 1982; Burk, 2002; Martin and McCausland,
2002; Snider 2003, 2003a).
In summary, the results of the data provided in
Hypothesis 2 support previous research (ATLDP,
2001; Snider and Watkins, 2002; Wong, 2002) which
indicates that the current culture of the U.S. Army
profession is out of balance with the future requirements of the Army profession. Additionally, the Army
profession’s cultural focus on stability and control are
resulting in “[t]op-down training directives and strategies combined with brief leader development experiences for junior officers [which] leads to a perception
that micromanagement is pervasive [and that] [p]ersonnel management requirements drive operational
[duty] assignments at the expense of quality developmental experiences” (ATLDP, 2001, p. 193). This is
unfortunate. A review of Figure 4 provides a graphic
illustration that professional behavior rests upon two
pillars: formal training and informal training. The
latter is accomplished by providing officers with a
career of worldwide operational assignments with
ever-increasing levels of authority and responsibility.
Informal training also includes individual self-development such as an officer earning an advanced de-
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gree on his or her own time, and mentoring programs
where senior officers give career guidance and counseling to junior officers. The cultural focus on stability
and control fosters micromanagement because senior
leaders believe that their career is directly dependent
upon the success of their subordinates; therefore, these
senior leaders take direct action that will not allow
their subordinates to fail; they micromanage, which
destroys, the “diagnosis-treatment-inference” cycle of
professional behavior, which is a critical component
of professional development of these junior professionals (Freidson, 1970, 1986; Abbott, 1988; Snider and
Watkins, 2002).
Even though the OCAI plot for the current culture
of the U.S. Army profession did not fall into the Hierarchy quadrant as predicted by Hypothesis 2, the
resulting plot is highly informative and equally disappointing for the Army profession.
Testing Hypothesis 3: Hypothesis 3 tests the assumption that even if the current (“Now”) culture of
the U.S. Army profession cannot be characterized as a
culture type that is supportive of professional behavior, that the “Preferred” culture type of the U.S. Army
profession, as identified by the survey respondents,
can be identified as a type of culture that is supportive
of professional behavior. As operationalized in this
study, cultures that are supportive of professional behavior can be characterized as adaptive, flexible, innovative, and boundary-spanning, which the Adhocracy
quadrant represents.
Figure 12 depicts the U.S. Army’s “Preferred” organizational culture archetype, as identified by the
533 (n=533) respondents to this study, as falling into
the Clan quadrant; the dashed lines forming a diamond shape on the graph. The mean scores for each
quadrant are: 28.97 for the Clan quadrant, 27.08 for
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the Market quadrant, 24.55 for the Adhocracy quadrant, and 19.34 for the Hierarchy quadrant. Therefore,
like Hypothesis 2, Hypothesis 3 should, on the surface,
be rejected since the resulting OCAI plot did not fall
dominantly into the Adhocracy quadrant. However,
the results of this plot are as suggestive as are the results of Hypothesis 2. A close analysis of these results
indicates a significant shift from the respondents’
perception of the current (“Now”) dominant culture
of the U.S. Army profession and the culture that they
would prefer (“Preferred”) to see as the dominant culture.

Figure 12. OCAI Profile Chart
for the “Preferred” U.S. Army Culture.
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Figure 13 provides a graphic representation of both
the “Now” and the “Preferred” plots (Figures 11 and
12) superimposed on one chart for ease of comparison.

Figure 13. OCAI Profile Chart for the “Now”
and “Preferred” U.S. Army Culture.
Using a Paired Samples T-Test, the differences between each quadrant’s “Now” and “Preferred” scores
were determined to be statistically significant (p≤.01).
Perhaps more important than the statistically significant difference in the paired scores is the change in
magnitude from a combined score that fell below the
“internal-external focus” axis, as was identified in the
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discussion of Hypothesis 2, to a composite score that
falls above the “internal-external focus” axis. A review of the discussion of Hypothesis 2 reveals that the
combined score for the Hierarchy and Market quadrants for the current “Now” Army culture was 66.79.
However, the data for Hypothesis 3 demonstrates that
the combined score for these Hierarchy and Market
quadrants using the “Preferred” scores is 46.42, which
is a 30 percent reduction in the respondents’ preferences for stability and control. By contrast, the combined scores for the Clan and Adhocracy quadrants
increased from 32.94 for the “Now” plot to 53.52, a 62
percent increase, which suggests the respondents’ desire to be part of an organizational culture that can be
characterized by flexibility and discretion—the hallmarks of professionalism. Additionally, the greatest
change in individual quadrant scores occurred in the
Adhocracy quadrant which saw a dramatic increase
of 109 percent, followed by a 37 percent increase in
the Clan quadrant score, a 33 percent decrease for the
Hierarchy quadrant, and a 29 percent decrease for the
Market quadrant. Therefore, to some extent, it would
be difficult to outright reject Hypothesis 3 in light of
these findings.
As outlined earlier in this study, these findings are
significant for two reasons. First, the data provide empirical validation that the Army’s current culture is incongruent with its preferred culture; and, second, that
there appear to be underlying cultural factors that are
inhibiting the Army from either providing appropriate professional development programs or that these
cultural factors are preventing the exercise of the professional skills being taught in current professional
development programs. In either case, the resulting
professional behavior of the Army profession’s future
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leaders does not appear to be congruent with the type
of professional development that should enable them
to successfully lead the Army and to confront the ambiguities of its future external environment.
As was accomplished for Hypothesis 1, an
ANOVA procedure was conducted across all demographic categories to determine if there were any
statistically significant differences in the mean scores
of these various demographic categories. There were
no statistically significant differences (p≤.05) between
respondent’s sex, age, rank, source of commission,
component, type of U.S. Army War College student,
and level of education. There was a very interesting
and statistically significant finding (p≤.05) that certain Army branch officers preferred the “adhocracy”
culture type more so than did other officers. These
branches included: Special Forces (Green Beret), Military Intelligence, Dental Corps, and Veterinary Corps.
This finding is not surprising since each of these
specialties traditionally operate with a significant
degree of autonomy and flexibility. Consequently,
it is understandable that these officers, who already
operate in, and are comfortable with flexibility and
discretion, would prefer that the entire organizational
culture reflect these deep-seated basic underlying assumptions. There was also a statistically significant
finding (p≤.05) that African-American officers had
a higher preference for a “clan” culture than did all
other officers. Once again, this finding is not particularly surprising. African-Americans still experience
a significant amount of racial discrimination in the
United States, although not as much in the Armed
Forces (Segal and Bourg, 2002). Consequently, it is
understandable that any minority group would prefer
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to belong to an organization whose culture could be
characterized as a “very friendly place to work where
people share a lot of themselves. . . . The organization
is held together by loyalty and tradition . . . [and] . . .
The organization emphasizes the long-term benefit
of human resources development and attaches great
importance to cohesion and morale” (Cameron and
Quinn, 1999, p. 96). Finally, officers in the Class of
2003 reported a statistically significant finding (p≤.05)
that they preferred an “adhocracy” culture more so
than did the officers in the Class of 2004. However, the
actual mean difference was only 1.38 points, and this
research was unable to uncover any practical significance or cause for this difference. In either case, both
classes preferred a statistically significant reduction
in the “hierarchy” and “market” cultures and a statistically significant increase in the “clan” and “adhocracy” cultures. All of these preferences have practical
significance as well, which are discussed in greater
detail later in this monograph.
In summary, this monograph discovered that the
“Preferred” dominant organizational culture type and
strength of the U.S. Army profession is strongly supportive of flexibility and discretion and can be characterized by a concern for people and teamwork, as well
as a strong interest in innovation, initiative, creativity,
and a long-term emphasis on growth and the acquisition of new resources.
Testing Hypothesis 4: The final hypothesis of
this study suggests that the individual professional
skills of the U.S. Army senior level officer corps are
not characterized by innovative, risk-taking, boundary spanning, demanding continuous improvement,
reflective-in-action, dynamic, or adaptive behavior.
Essentially, this implies that an MSAI plot of the 12
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competency categories will not result in a dominant
plot in the Adhocracy quadrant of the MSAI profile.
The underlying assumption is that the current organizational culture of the U.S. Army profession inhibits
formal and informal professional development programs and professional experiences from providing
the educational opportunities that will foster professional growth, as well as innovative, flexible, and
adaptive behaviors that will enhance future survival
of the Army profession (ATLDP, 2001, Snider and
Watkins, 2002). Instead of constantly challenging the
current professional knowledge base and esoteric professional skills, Hypothesis 4 assumes that the current
professional development program of the U.S. Army
profession results in “homosocial reproduction”
(Martin, 2002). Kanter (1977) indicates that homosocial reproduction is a process whereby those who are
selected and prepared to become the future leaders of
an organization tend to reflect the patterns of existing
leaders, thereby fostering a perpetuation of existing
values and culture as opposed to encouraging a culture that challenges the status quo.
Figure 14 depicts the U.S. Army senior level officer
corps’ self evaluation of their management/leadership
skills assessment, as identified by the 533 (n=533) respondents to this study, as predominantly falling into
the Clan quadrant. Unlike the OCAI which had only
one score for each quadrant, the MSAI is comprised
of 12 competency categories with three categories in
each quadrant. See Table 3 for a detailed review of the
12 MSAI competency categories. The mean scores for
each quadrant are as follows. The three competency
categories for the Clan culture type are: Managing
Teams (MT) - 4.16, Managing Interpersonal Relationships (MIR) - 4.16, and Managing the Development

92

of Others (MD) - 4.16 for a composite quadrant score
of 4.16. The three competency categories for the Adhocracy culture type are: Managing Innovation (MI)
- 3.99; Managing the Future (MF) - 3.86; and Managing Continuous Improvement (MCI) - 4.01, for a composite quadrant score of 3.95. The three competency
categories for the Market culture type are: Managing
Competitiveness (MC) - 3.50, Energizing Employees
(EE) - 3.94, and Managing Customer Service (MCS) 3.78 for a composite quadrant score of 3.74. Finally,
the three competency categories for the Hierarchy
culture type are: Managing Acculturation (MA) - 3.98,
Managing the Control System (MCS) - 3.69, and Managing Coordination (MCo) 3.83, for a composite quadrant score of 3.83. Therefore, like Hypotheses 2 and 3,
Hypothesis 4 should, on the surface, be rejected since
the resulting MSAI plot did not fall primarily into the
Adhocracy quadrant. However, the results of this plot
are as equally informative as the results of Hypotheses
2 and 3. A close analysis of these results indicates that
the respondents perceive that their strongest skills are
supportive of the “clan” type culture, with the second
highest composite score being supportive of the “adhocracy” type culture, the third highest MSAI composite score being supportive of the “hierarchy” culture type and the lowest composite MSAI score being
supportive of the “market” culture type. These scores,
similar to the OCAI scores for Hypothesis 3, indicate
that these officers perceive that their strongest skills
fall above the “internal-external focus” axis which indicates their perceived skills can be characterized by
flexibility and discretion which are the hallmarks of
professionalism.
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Figure 14. MSAI Profile Chart for the
U.S. Army Senior Level Officer Corps.
Like Hypotheses 1 and 3, an analysis of variance
procedure (ANOVA) was conducted across all demographic categories to determine if there were any
statistically significant differences in the mean scores
of these various demographic categories. There were
no statistically significant differences (p≤.05) between
respondents’ rank, branch, component, and War College class. There was a statistically significant finding
(p≤.05) that female officers rated themselves higher
in all 12 MSAI competency categories than did the
male officers. Since women are generally perceived as
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having greater interpersonal skills than do men, this
finding is not surprising for the six MSAI categories
that are related to interpersonal skills. However, the
higher scores in the remaining six MSAI categories
could be a result of the greater level of competition
that women experience as indicated earlier in the
analysis of Hypothesis 1. Consequently, since women
believe that they must work harder to gain the same
level of respect, these scores may be a reflection of that
perception. However, for the purposes of this study,
this finding does not have much practical significance,
since the overall trend for both men and women is consistent with the results indicated in Figure 14. There
was also a statistically significant finding (p≤.05) that
officers over the age of 50 rated themselves as having
higher “adhocracy” skills then did younger officers.
Since officers of this age tend to be near the end of
their military careers and at the rank of colonel, it is
very possible that they do exercise a greater degree
of autonomy and a willingness to take risks. There
was a statistically significant finding (p≤.05) that officers who received their commissions through “Officer Candidate School (OCS)” perceived themselves
as having greater “clan” competencies than did other
officers. This finding may be a result of the fact that
these officers normally were enlisted soldiers prior to
entering OCS and consequently they had prior leadership and interpersonal skills experience. Because
of their prior enlisted experience, these officers tend
to feel a well-deserved kinship with enlisted soldiers
and a higher than average ability to relate to them on a
personal and professional level. Therefore, this finding
is not particularly surprising. There was also a statistically significant finding (p≤.05) that African-American
officers rated themselves higher in the “clan” MSAI
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competencies than did the other officers. Considering
that the African-American officers demonstrated a
statistically significant higher preference for the Clan
quadrant than did other officers, it is not surprising
that they perceive their own “clan” competencies as
higher than average. Also, like the finding for women,
this finding does not have much practical significance,
since all officers rated their own personal managerial/
leadership skills higher in this quadrant than the other
three quadrants. There was also an interesting and statistically significant finding (p≤.05) that officers in the
Distance Education program rated their “clan” and
“adhocracy” MSAI competencies higher than did the
officers in the resident program. Since the majority of
these officers are reserve component officers it could
naturally be assumed that their civilian careers and
training have a significant and concurrent effect on
their managerial/leadership competencies. However,
the data indicate that there were no statistically significant differences between reserve component and
active duty officers. Consequently, it is possible that
the officers selected for the resident program, which
traditionally has more prestige, have been selected because their skills are more congruent with the current
Army culture, which can be seen as a manifestation
of the concept of homosocial reproduction (Martin,
2002). Finally, there was a statistically significant finding (p≤.05) that officers with a Ph.D. scored themselves
lower in the “market” competencies than did the other
officers. This finding is consistent with the previous
findings that indicted that Ph.D.s had a higher preference for the Adhocracy quadrant. It is not surprising
that officers with Ph.D.s perceive themselves as being
more innovative, adaptive, and entrepreneurial and
consequently less competitive, goal-oriented, and de-
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manding as is typified by the “market” MSAI competencies.
It is interesting to note that the basic shape of the
MSAI plot and the OCAI “Preferred” plot are very
similar, especially with the “clan” culture type receiving the highest score in both survey instruments. It is
highly probable that in their responses to Hypothesis
3 that the 533 Army respondents identified a “Preferred” organizational culture type that is more congruent with the type of managerial/leadership skills
which they believe that they currently possess. It is
also interesting to note that in both cases the “Preferred” culture and the MSAI managerial/leadership
skills are diametrically opposite to the “market” culture type, which as you may recall was identified in
Hypothesis 2 as the dominant Army professional culture type. The Competing Values Framework (CVF)
indicates that the diagonal relationships between the
four quadrants are negative (Quinn and Rohrbaugh,
1983; Cameron and Quinn, 1999). This data provides
strong support for the contention that the Army professional culture is “out of balance,” as indicated
by the ATLDP (2001) and is not congruent with the
professional skills necessary to support professional
growth and survival (Freidson, 1970, 1986; Mosher,
1982; Abbott, 1988; Snider and Watkins, 2002).
Final Analysis.
The principal purpose for this study was to answer
the following primary research question: Is the organizational culture of the U.S. Army congruent with
the professional development of its senior level officer corps? This monograph outlined four research hypotheses which were employed to provide empirical
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data to help answer the primary research question. In
light of the resulting data which has been enumerated
and analyzed in this chapter there is strong support
indicating that the U.S. Army professional culture is
not congruent with the professional development of
its senior level officer corps. Hypotheses 1 and 2 provided strong empirical data, a combined OCAI score
of 66.79 for the Market and Hierarchy quadrants, indicating that the dominant organizational culture type
and strength of the U.S. Army profession is highly reflective of stability and control and can be characterized by an emphasis on hard-driving competitiveness
within a very formalized and structured place to work,
as opposed to being distinguished by innovation, flexibility, and long-term growth, which are the characteristics that most clearly represent the hallmarks of
professional cultures (Freidson, 1970, 1986; Argyris
and Schon, 1974; Mosher, 1982; Schon, 1983; Abbott,
1988; Senge 1994, Middlehurst and Kennie, 1997; Magee and Somervell, 1998; FM 22-100, 1999, Martin and
McCausland, 2002; Snider, 2003a).
Hypothesis 3 demonstrated that the future leaders of the Army profession strongly preferred an organizational culture which is dramatically different
from the one that they believe currently exists in the
Army profession. The OCAI data plot found that the
“Preferred” dominant organizational culture type and
strength of the U.S. Army profession is strongly supportive of flexibility and discretion and can be characterized by a concern for people and teamwork, as well
as a strong interest in innovation, initiative, creativity,
and a long-term emphasis on growth and the acquisition of new resources, as indicated by a dominant plot
in the Clan quadrant. Additionally, it is important to
note that the greatest change in individual quadrant
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scores occurred in the Adhocracy quadrant which
saw a dramatic increase of 109 percent, followed by
a 37 percent increase in the Clan quadrant score, a
33 percent decrease for the Hierarchy quadrant, and
a 29 percent decrease for the Market quadrant. Consequently, this study data indicates that the Army’s
current professional culture is incongruent with its
preferred culture. The data indicate that there appears
to be underlying cultural factors that are inhibiting the
Army from either providing appropriate professional
development programs, or that these cultural factors
are preventing the exercise of the professional skills
that are being taught in current professional development programs.
Hypothesis 4 provided empirical data that indicates that the respondents perceive that their strongest
skills are supportive of the “clan” type culture, with
the second highest composite score being supportive of the “adhocracy” type culture, the third highest
MSAI composite score being supportive of the “hierarchy” culture type and the lowest composite MSAI
score being supportive of the “market” culture type.
These data provide strong support for the contention
that the Army professional culture is “out of balance,”
as indicated by the ATLDP (2001) and is not congruent with the professional skills necessary to support
professional growth and survival (Freidson, 1970,
1986; Mosher, 1982; Abbott, 1988; Snider and Watkins,
2002).
Finally, the study provided empirical data strongly suggesting that a homogeneous culture exists
within the senior level officer corps of the U.S. Army.
The various ANOVA procedures indicated that there
were virtually no statistically significant differences
between the 10 demographic categories employed by
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this study that would change or modify the overall results obtained by this study. The few small differences
that were observed supported the overall finding of
the hypothesis but usually to a stronger degree. This
finding has important considerations for the overall
study because it indicates that the U.S. Army’s professional development program, as conceptualized
by this study, generates consistent values throughout
the senior level officer corps. This finding is also important because it indicates that there is little if any
sub-cultural influence on the larger homogeneous
U.S. Army culture. As indicated earlier in this monograph, it was theorized that if a homogeneous culture
does exist within the senior level officer corps, even if
those values are not congruent with that of a professional organization, then the potential for a successful cultural intervention is favorable. This implies, as
suggested from the functionalist perspective, that the
U.S. Army’s culture is an attribute of the organization
and can be modified, although not easily (Sathe, 1983).
Consequently, the data suggest that to some extent the
professional development program is instilling moderately professional values and skills as indicated by
the “Preferred” OCAI organizational culture plot in
the Clan quadrant and the MSAI managerial/leadership skills plot also in the Clan quadrant. The question that should be raised at this point and will be discussed in the final section of this monograph is why
do these senior level Army professionals perceive the
current Army professional culture to be primarily in
the Market quadrant and secondarily in the Hierarchy quadrant, which are essentially the antitheses of
the Clan and Adhocracy quadrants?
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IMPLICATIONS
Overview.
This research strongly suggests that there is a lack
of congruence between the U.S. Army professional
culture and the professional development programs
of the Army’s senior level leaders. This conclusion is
based on the empirical data provided in the Findings
and Analysis section that indicate that the future leaders of the Army profession believe that they operate
on a day-to-day basis in a profession whose culture
is characterized by an overarching desire for stability,
control, formal rules and policies, coordination and efficiency, goal and results oriented, and hard-driving
competitiveness. However, the respondents of this
study also indicated that the Army’s professional
culture should be one that emphasizes flexibility, discretion, participation, human resource development,
innovation, creativity, risk-taking, and a long-term
emphasis on professional growth and the acquisition
of new professional knowledge and skills. These characteristics have been identified in the Brief Discussion of the Concepts of Organizational Culture and
Professionalism section of this monograph as being
representative of professional cultures (Argyris and
Schon, 1974; Kline, 1981; Freidson, 1970, 1986; Abbott,
1988; Schon, 1983; Senge, 1994; Davis et al., 1997; FM
22-100, 1999; Snider and Watkins, 2002; Paparone,
2003). The purpose of this section is to discuss the implications of these research findings.
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Implications for the Army Profession.
As discussed in the Introduction section of this
monograph, it is theorized that organizational culture, those taken-for-granted, deep basic underlying
assumptions within an organization (Schein, 1992),
unconsciously influences the formulation of the training and professional development that future organizational leaders are given to enable them to promote
organizational interests well into the future. You may
recall that it was proposed that the investigation of
this relationship would have significant analytical
potential. For example, if the survival of a profession
is based upon its ability to readily and continuously
adapt to a changing external environment (Mosher,
1982; Freidson, 1986; Abbott, 1988; Senge, 1994; Martin and McCausland, 2002; Snider, 2003, 2003a; Gordon and Sollinger 2004), can an organization’s culture
inherently prevent it from successful professional survival because of the way it educates its future leaders? Does the unconscious pattern of ambiguity reduction, “the way we do things around here” (Bower,
1966; Deal and Kennedy, 1982, p. 4), create a pattern
of homosocial reproduction (Kanter, 1977)? The data
provided by this study strongly support the assertion
that organizational culture can inhibit the professional
development of the profession’s future leaders by influencing the professional development program, particularly the formal and informal training aspects of
professional development program.
The study data powerfully indicate that there is
a lack of congruence between the current culture (as
indicated by the “Now” OCAI plot) of the Army profession and the type of culture which the future senior
Army leaders would prefer to see in place (as indicat-
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ed by the “Preferred” OCAI plot). In addition, there
is a lack of congruence between the current Army
professional culture and the individual professional
skills of those future Army leaders (as indicated by the
MSAI plots). What the lack of congruence suggests is
that there may be a paradoxical relationship between
the managerial/leadership skills that are taught in
the formal training programs7 (such as senior service
war colleges) and those informal professional development aspects of the program such as personnel
policies and the Officer Evaluation System, retirement programs, and the “up or out” policy. In other
words, the managerial/leadership theory taught in
the formal professional education process can be considered to be analogous to the “espoused values” of
the Army profession, while the informal professional
development program, which includes operational assignments and personnel policies, reflects the operant
or “theories-in-use” of the Army profession (Argyris
and Schon, 1974). A review of the definition of “espoused values” indicates that organizations publicly
give allegiance to these values and attempt to communicate them to their members, external stakeholders, and frequently to the general public. Espoused
values are often evident in organizational strategies,
goals, philosophies, training programs, and published
organizational value statements. However, espoused
values may not be based on prior cultural learning.
Therefore, they may be incongruent with the organization’s actual “theories-in-use” (Argyris and Schon,
1974). Theories-in-use is defined as those values that
actually govern behavior. It is theorized that a lack of
congruence between espoused values and theoriesin-use can inhibit individual commitment and subsequently impair organizational performance (Argyris
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and Schon, 1974; Schon, 1983; Schein, 1992). What
these findings imply is that those in the Army profession are reasonably aware of the type of professional
managerial/leadership skills that should be imparted
to new generations of senior leaders of the professional officer corps as reflected by the “Preferred” OCAI
organizational culture plot, and the MSAI plots in the
Clan and Adhocracy quadrants. However, the current
Army professional culture, “the way we do things
around here” (Bower, 1966; Deal and Kennedy, 1982,
p. 4), demonstrates that deep underlying assumptions
result in behavior that is diametrically opposite to that
which is espoused in the Army profession’s formal
professional development process. Other research
supports this finding by indicating that the Army profession more reflexively rewards stability and control
and encourages excessively structured supervision by
severely punishing innovation and risk-taking that results in failure (ATLDP, 2001; LeBouef, 2002; Wong,
2002). Wong supports this assessment by stating that
the “current situation of over-control reflects the [Army’s] culture. . . . The Army now has a culture where
the obsession with minimizing risk and uncertainty
has pervaded not just the leadership, but also the way
the entire institution thinks and works” (2002, p. 28).
LeBoeuf concurs by stating that
the ATLDP [2001] assessed Army culture as “out of
balance” and failing to provide the conditions necessary to preserve the Army’s professional standing. . . .
In other words, the professed principles of officers do
not always coincide with their actual practices. Army
culture must reflect a set of conditions that embody
a mutually supportive and trustworthy relationship
between individual professionals within the organization and the Army as a profession (2002, p. 491).
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Numerous other studies have also indicated that
the Army profession’s emphasis on stability and control is contrary to the long-term survival of the Army
profession (Builder, 1989; Scroggs, 1996; ATLDP,
2001; Snider and Watkins, 2002; Wong, 2002; Snider,
2009; Wardynski et al., 2010a; Moten, 2010). Schein
states that organizational leaders must learn “how to
enhance elements of the culture that are congruent
with new environmental realities while changing dysfunctional elements of the culture” (1999, p. 144). The
empirical data provided by this study indicate that the
leadership of the Army profession should seriously
consider embarking upon an organizational culture
change effort as described by Bolman and Deal (1991);
Cameron and Quinn (1999); Schein (1999); and Watkins and Snider (2002).
The data also demonstrate that there is a relatively
homogeneous Army culture. Despite the diversity of
the respondents, the data suggest that these Army
senior level professionals have been acculturated in
such a manner as to view the Army profession in a
fairly consistent way. To reiterate this point, Jans and
Schmidtchen (2002) emphasize that a formalized program of professional development produces both desirable and undesirable outcomes. For example, the
research data from the “Preferred” OCAI and MSAI
plots suggests that the Army’s professional development program reinforces the Army’s culture of professionalism and community, both of which are desirable.
However, portions of the professional development
program also strengthen the aspects of the organization’s culture that encourage hierarchy, conservatism,
and an emphasis on rules and structure, which are inimical to professionalism. Consequently, the current
lack of congruence between the Army professional
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culture and the professional development program
indicates that this obvious example of homosocial reproduction (Kanter, 1977) is detrimental to the longterm survival of the Army profession. There is, however, a silver lining to this apparent cloud. Since the
current professional development process is capable
of producing such strong uniformity in the behavior
and values of the Army profession’s future leaders, it
is postulated that changes to the professional development process, such as the experimental “produce or
out” career system discussed earlier (Crawley, 2004),
or a personnel realignment toward a true lifelong
profession, have the potential to produce a beneficial
uniformity among future Army professionals. For example, the “produce or out” system may very well encourage initiative and innovation by rewarding risktaking instead of punishing it.
In conclusion, the research data provide empirical
support to the findings of the ATLDP (2001), which
suggests that the training and leader development
programs of the Army profession are not adequately
linked and integrated within the Army culture (LeBoeuf, 2002). The future strategic environment which
confronts the Army profession can be characterized
by ambiguity and uncertainty. The brief discussion
of the concepts of organizational culture and professionalism have demonstrated that professional
organizations whose organizational culture can be
characterized as emphasizing flexibility, discretion,
and innovation have the greatest potential to operate
within ambiguous and uncertain environments. The
research data strongly suggest that the Army’s culture
is preventing the individual exercise of the excellent
professional skills that are being taught in the Army’s
formalized professional development program. Con-
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sequently, as suggested by Schein, “[o]rganizational
cultures are created in part by leaders, and one of the
most decisive functions of leadership is the creation,
management, and sometimes even the destruction of
culture” (1992, p. 5). If the Army profession expects
to maintain its social legitimacy and professional jurisdiction, which are focused on the development
and application of the esoteric knowledge and related
practical professional skills of land warfare (Snider,
2003a), then the Army profession must take steps to
bring its professional culture and particularly the informal professional development program into congruency and pointed in the direction that favors flexibility, discretion, and innovation.
Until now, the relationship between organizational culture and professional development has been
more assumed and theorized than validated. The data
provided by this study begin to fill that empirical gap
and provide strong evidence that a lack of congruence
between the two can create long-term detrimental
impacts on organizational performance, resulting in
a lack of commitment from organizational members
(Schein, 1999).
These methods strongly support the belief that organizational culture can be perceived as an attribute of
the organization, which can be empirically identified,
measured, evaluated, and changed, and is manifested
in organizational behaviors (Ouchi, 1981; Peters and
Waterman, 1982; Schein, 1985; Cameron and Ettington, 1988; Trice and Beyer, 1993; Schneider, 1994; Cameron and Quinn, 1999; Martin, 2002). To emphasize
this point, it was recommended above that the leaders
of the Army profession initiate an organizational culture change effort to eliminate the lack of perceived
congruence between the Army’s professional culture
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and its professional development program. However,
within this perspective, the data appear to support the
contention that organizational culture may actually
be a much more complex construct, one that is more
reflective of the concept of interdependence than that
of simply a dependent or an independent variable.
For example, Weick (1979) states that in an “interdependent relationship,” the designation of one event
as a “cause” and another event as an “effect” is the
result of an arbitrary and incomplete analysis. Instead,
Weick (1979) indicates that in an interdependent relationship, events routinely cycle back and forth, being
a cause at one time and an effect at another. In other
words, one event may influence others, but is then in
turn influenced by the resultant action of those other
events. In the case of the Army profession’s culture,
the more informal aspects of the professional development program, such as the less than lifelong commitment to the Army profession, the “up or out” personnel policy, and the officer evaluation system which
may be creating an underlying value and deep assumption that failure will not be tolerated regardless
of the circumstances are representative of theories-inuse that are incongruent with the concept of professionalism. Consequently, senior leaders may be exercising an excessive degree of structured supervision
which reinforces the culture of stability and control
despite the formal education system which attempts
to teach the opposite. Therefore, it is not surprising
that junior professionals learn to distrust their senior
leaders and to then subsequently perpetuate the cycle
of over-control (Wong, 2002), or depart the profession
altogether (Wardynski et al., 2010a).
The use of the OCAI and MSAI analytical instruments in combination with an informed organizational insider8 appear to provide an adequate comprise
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between a long-term qualitative ethnographic study
and a short-term quantitative analysis. Cameron and
Quinn summarize the importance of conducting organizational culture analysis by stating that:
The need to diagnose and manage organizational
culture is growing in importance partly because of an
increasing need to merge and mold different organizations’ cultures as structural changes have occurred
(for instance, when units are consolidated, when
downsizing and outsourcing eliminate parts of the organization, or when entire organizations merge). The
escalating importance of culture is also partly a result
of the increasing turbulence, complexity, and unpredictability faced by organizations in their external environments (1999, p. 131).

Echoing the remarks of Cameron and Quinn
above, this study has demonstrated the practical significance of an organizational culture analysis for the
Army profession. Not only is the Army profession’s
survival as a profession of particular importance, but
its ability to maintain its superiority over the esoteric
knowledge of land warfare is an absolutely crucial social responsibility for the preservation of the American way of life.
In summary, this study supports the premise that
organizational culture is a complex construct that is
more than just a variable and more than just a “thick
description” of organizational behavior. Additionally,
the study also supports the assertion that a strong
cultural analysis can be accomplished through the
use of a highly valid and reliable assessment instrument such as the OCAI and MSAI survey instruments.
However, an even richer and deeper analysis can be
achieved through the use of qualitative methods such
as an informed insider.
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It is important to note that this research project has
not taken a longitudinal perspective. That is, repeatedly administering the survey instruments over a number of years to develop trend data and to determine
if the deep-seated underlying assumptions that comprise culture are enduring. However, several related
studies that were completed previously have been
reviewed, and they do provide some support for the
contention that there is a homogeneous Army culture.
Additionally, these other studies also provide a slight
degree of “triangulation” of the resulting research
data and were highlighted in the Findings and Analysis section. Therefore, a future research opportunity
may be directed toward a more traditional long-term
ethnographic analysis supported by the quantitative
tools used by this study. It is postulated that such an
analysis may be able to provide more than just a snapshot of where the organization currently is and where
it may want to go. Instead, such an analysis may be
able to more adequately explain some of the highly
subjective ideational aspects of “the way we do things
around here” (Bower, 1966; Triandis, 1972; Deal and
Kennedy, 1982, p. 4). Such an analysis may be able to
support the symbolic constructs of the semiotic perspective which encourages different ways of thinking and subsequently influencing different aspects of
organizational phenomena (Tsoukas, 1991). Srivastva
and Barrett support this perspective by stating that:
The process of giving language to experience is more
than just sense-making. Naming also directs actions
toward the object you have named because it promotes activity consistent with the related attribution
it carries. To change the name of an object connotes
changing your relationship to the object and how one
will behave in relationship to it because when we name
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something, we direct anticipations, expectations, and
evaluations towards it (1988, pp. 34-35).

Additionally, it would be beneficial for such a
long-term analysis to track the actual organizational
culture change efforts, for example, if the Army profession was able to transition its culture from predominantly a Market culture to an Adhocracy culture,
would there be a resulting increase in organizational
performance and effectiveness?
In conclusion, “[s]tudies of organizational culture
share a common goal: to uncover and interpret aspects
of organizational life so that we can better understand
the perceptions, beliefs, and actions of organizational
members” (Martin et al., 1997, p. 3). An organization’s
culture enables its members to work through the basic
problems of survival in and adaptation to the external
environment as well as to develop and maintain internal processes that perpetuate adaptability and promote the organization’s continued existence (Parsons,
1951; Merton, 1957; Schein, 1985, Martin, 2002). Schein
emphasizes that the study of organizational culture is
important because organizational culture is the property of a group and that:
. . . it is a powerful, latent, and often unconscious
set of forces that determine both our individual and
collective behavior, ways of perceiving, thought patterns, and values. Organizational culture in particular
matters because cultural elements determine strategy,
goals, and modes of operating. The values and thought
patterns of leaders and senior managers are partially
determined by their own cultural backgrounds and
their shared experience. If we want to make organizations more efficient and effective, then we must understand the role that culture plays in organizational life
(1999, p. 14).
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Consequently, one of the principal reasons for the
popular interest in the study of organizational culture
is to determine the linkage between it and organizational performance (Berrio, 2003). This study has reviewed a previously assumed but unverified connection between organizational culture and professional
development. It has uncovered a lack of congruence
between the dominant type of organizational culture of the U.S. Army and the professional managerial/leadership skills of its senior level leaders. This
observed lack of congruence may be inhibiting performance and unconsciously perpetuating a cycle of
caution and an over reliance on stability and control.
The data indicates that the U.S. Army is illustrative of
an organization that emphasizes stability and control
and that attempts to comprehend the ambiguity of the
future through an unconscious reliance upon the successful solutions employed in the past.
ENDNOTES
1. Cameron and Quinn (1999) state that “cultural congruence means that various aspects of an organization’s culture are
aligned. That is, the same culture types are emphasized in various
parts of the organization. For example, in a congruent culture the
strategy, leadership style, reward system, approach to managing
employees, and dominant characteristics, all tend to emphasize
the same set of cultural values (1999, p. 64).” This study employs
the Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI) to
diagnose the U.S. Army’s culture as identified by selected U.S.
Army senior leaders. Then, the study evaluates the level of congruence between the identified U.S. Army cultural types to the
managerial/leadership competencies of these selected senior
leaders as identified through the use of the Managerial Skills Assessment Instrument (MSAI). The ostensible objective is to determine if professional development programs support or inhibit the
promotion of senior leadership skills which will sustain future
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professional growth, and survival. This is important because as
Cameron and Quinn emphasize, cultural incongruence leads to
differences in perspectives, goals, and strategies which drain organizational energy and prevent the organization from operating
at the highest level of effectiveness (1999, pp. 64-65).
2. Senior leader skills which are characteristic of professional
organizations include the following types of behavior: innovative, risk-taking, boundary spanning, adaptive, and reflective-inaction. What these concepts mean is that individual professionals
must be trained to challenge the status quo. They must question
previous success and the procedures that fostered that success.
Professionals must be willing to constantly strive to find new answers to old questions and new questions that have yet to be asked.
They must seek constant improvement and the expansion of their
professional knowledge base. They must be willing to stick their
necks out and take risks for the betterment of society and their
profession. They must be willing to experiment and they must be
willing to accept failure and to learn from failure. Finally, professionals must be willing to span boundaries, that is, they must be
willing to go beyond their own organizational and professional
boundaries in the search of new knowledge, techniques and procedures, that can be imported into their professional knowledge
base, and used in their own practical professional skills, as well as
to potentially identify new areas for professional growth (Argyris
and Schon, 1974; Aldrich and Herker, 1977; Weick, 1979; Mosher,
1982; Schon, 1983; Freidman, 1986; Senge, 1994; Cameron and
Quinn, 1999; Wong, 2002; Snider, 2003a; Gordon and Sollinger,
2004).
3. “Social Construction of Reality” theory implies that “there
is no reality apart from social meanings, but that we can know
reality only by categorizing it, naming it, and giving it meaning.
. . . Categories are human mental constructs in a world that has
only continua” (Stone, 1988, p. 307). In other words, the intellectual boundaries that we employ to circumscribe experiences and
social knowledge help us to comprehend the meaning of these
experiences and to provide order to what would otherwise be a
chaotic existence. Therefore, reality is a socially constructed phenomena that is the product of human activity (Berger and Luckmann, 1966).
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4. Mosher states that “the professions are social mechanisms,
whereby knowledge, particularly new knowledge, is translated
into action and service. They provide the means whereby intellectual achievement becomes operational (1982, p. 112).” In describing professional work, Abbott states that the “tasks of professions are human problems amenable to expert service. They may
be problems for individuals, like sickness and salvation, or for
groups, like fundraising and auditing. They may be disturbing
problems to be cured, like vandalism or neurosis, or they may be
creative problems to be solved, like a building design or a legislative program. The degree of resort to experts varies from problem
to problem, from society to society, and from time to time (1988, p.
35).” Schon indicates that professional knowledge, and therefore
individual professionals and professional organizations, must
continuously expand their knowledge and practitioner base because of the “changing character of the situations of practice—the
complexity, uncertainty, instability, uniqueness, and value conflicts which are increasingly perceived as central to the world of
professional practice (1983, p. 14).” Consequently, professional
organizations must be characterized by reflective, innovative,
flexible, and risk-taking thinking and behavior.“ In contrast to
normal bureaucratic emphasis on uniform procedures, objective
measures of performance, and center/periphery systems of control, a reflective institution must place a high priority on flexible
procedures, differentiated response, qualitative appreciation of
complex processes, and decentralized responsibility for judgment
and action (Schon, 1983, p. 338). Argyris and Schon indicate that
“professional practice requires practitioners to have the special
competences related to diagnosis, to the generation and testing
of solutions, and to the experience of personal causality in implementing solutions (1974, p. 172).” In summary, these authors indicate that professional organizations are characterized by dynamic, innovative, entrepreneurial, creative, and risk-taking behavior.
This perspective of professional organizations is incorporated
throughout this study.
5. Janusian thinking derives its name from the Roman god
Janus who was described as being able to look in opposite directions at the same time. In his study on creativity, Rothenberg
(1979) found that the ability to embrace paradox, which is the simultaneous existence of contradictory but interrelated concepts,
is what leads to the significant advances in art and science. Fur-
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ther emphasizing the importance of this concept for organizational transformation, Quinn and McGrath state that
“Einstein’s observation that a falling object could be simultaneously moving and at rest is a Janusian idea. In sum,
Janusian thinking offers the resolution of psychological contradiction in such a way that the resolution generates great
productive energy. In the mind, new theories and insights
emerge. In organizations, a new culture evolves in which
leaders and followers raise one another to higher levels of
motivation and morality” (1985, pp. 316-317).

6. The mission of the U.S. Army War College is to

“prepare selected military, civilian, and international leaders for the responsibilities of strategic leadership; educate
current and future leaders on the development and employment of landpower in a joint, multinational and interagency
environment; conduct research and publish on national security and military strategy; and engage in activities in support of the Army’s strategic communication efforts” (U.S.
Army War College Home Page, 2004, available from www.
carlisle.army.mil).

7. It is interesting to note that during the research for this
study, the author conducted a content review of the professional
leadership literature promulgated by the U.S. Army in a wide
variety of Army Regulations, Field Manuals, textbooks, supplemental readings, and monographs, and found this literature to
be comprised of some of the finest leadership and organizational
theory available today.
8. The “insider” vs “outsider” cultural research distinction is
based on the perspective in which the researcher obtains the relevant data upon which to base his research findings. For example,
Martin states that outsider
“cultural research includes any study, quantitative or qualitative, in which the conceptual categories are imposed by
the researcher rather than initiated by the cultural member
who is being studied. The key, for an etic [outsider] study,
is to explain cogently why these particular concepts and
operationalizations were chosen, usually with reference to
both reliability and validity. . . . Usually, in etic [outsider]
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research, categories are deduced from prior theory and research, not from material gathered from a study (2002, p.
36).”

The present study primarily uses the outsider approach, that
is, the research questions have been developed prior to the beginning of the study. However, the development of the research
questions was based on the author’s “insider” experience as a career U.S. Army professional.
The “insider” perspective is adopted from social anthropologists who argued that cultural researchers must endeavor to observe and understand cultural behavior as if the researcher was
a member of the culture being observed. In other words, the cultural researcher must attempt “to grasp the native’s point of view,
his relation to life, to realize his vision of the world (Malinowski,
1961, p. 25).” Schein states that the “most efficient and possibly
valid way to decipher cultural assumptions is for an outsider
to work directly with a group of motivated insiders on a model
of artifacts, values, and assumptions. This works best when the
group has some purpose for conducting the cultural analysis and
when there are no special communication barriers in the group
that would prevent a free flow of communication. . . . The main
purpose of the resulting cultural description is to provide insight
to the organization so that it can figure out how different cultural
assumptions aid or hinder what members are trying to do (1992,
p. 168, emphasis added).”
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APPENDIX A
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE ASSESSMENT
INSTRUMENT (OCAI)*
In this survey, “the organization” means “THE U.S.
ARMY,” not subordinate organizations or branches in
the U.S. Army such as a battalion, brigade, division, or
infantry or armor branch, etc. Rate each of the statements by dividing 100 points between A, B, C, and D
depending on how similar the description is to “THE
U.S. ARMY” (100 is very similar and 0 is not at all
similar to “THE U.S. ARMY”). The total points for
each question must equal 100. Repeat this for how
you feel “THE ARMY” is now (NOW) and how you
think it should be (PREFERRED).
For example, in question 1, assume that you gave 75
points to A, 10 points to B, 15 points to C, and 0 points
to D. Your responses would be written as indicated
in the following sample response. This would indicate that the organization is predominantly a personal
place and not at all a controlled and structured place.
If you gave 25 points to each one, it would mean that
each of the characteristics are exactly equal. Once you
have completed the “NOW” column indicating how
things are done in “THE U.S. ARMY” now, complete
the “PREFERRED” column for how you believe things
should be done in “THE U.S. ARMY.” You may use
only four numbers that total to 100. Please note: Fill
in a number in each column even if that number is
0. Thank you!
* Reprinted with permission from Professor Kim Cameron.
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SAMPLE RESPONSE
1. DOMINANT CHARACTERISTICS
NOW

PREFERRED

A. The organization is a very personal place. It is like an extended family. People seem to share a lot of themselves.

A __75_

A __25_

B. The organization is a very dynamic and entrepreneurial
place. People are willing to stick their necks out and take
risks.

B __10_

B __45_

C.The organization is very results oriented. A major concern
is with getting the job done. People are very competitive
and achievement oriented.

C __15_

C __25_

D. The organization is a very controlled and structured place.
Formal procedures generally govern what people do.

D ___0_

D _ 5_

100

100

NOW

PREFERRED

A. The organization is a very personal place. It is like an extended family. People seem to share a lot of themselves.

A ____

A ____

B. The organization is a very dynamic and entrepreneurial
place. People are willing to stick their necks out and take
risks.

B ____

B ____

C.The organization is very results oriented. A major concern
is with getting the job done. People are very competitive
and achievement oriented.

C ____

C ____

D. The organization is a very controlled and structured
place. Formal procedures generally govern what people
do.

D ____

D ____

100

100

Total
1. DOMINANT CHARACTERISTICS

Total
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2. ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP
NOW

PREFERRED

A. The leadership in the organization is generally considered
to exemplify mentoring, facilitating, or nurturing.

A ____

A ____

B. The leadership in the organization is generally considered
to exemplify entrepreneurship, innovating, or risk taking.

B ____

B ____

C.The leadership in the organization is generally considered
to exemplify a no-nonsense, aggressive, results-oriented focus.

C ____

C ____

D.The leadership in the organization is generally considered
to exemplify coordinating, organizing, or smooth-running efficiency.

D ____

D ____

100

100

NOW

PREFERRED

A.The management style in the organization is characterized
by teamwork, consensus, and participation.

A ____

A ____

B. The management style in the organization is characterized by individual risk-taking, innovation, freedom, and
uniqueness.

B ____

B ____

C.The management style in the organization is characterized by hard-driving competitiveness, high demands,
and achievement.

C ____

C ____

D. The management style in the organization is characterized
by security of employment, conformity, predictability,
and stability in relationships.

D ____

D ____

100

100

Total

3. MANAGEMENT OF EMPLOYEES

Total
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4. ORGANIZATIONAL GLUE
NOW

PREFERRED

A. The glue that holds the organization together is loyalty
and mutual trust. Commitment to this organization runs
high.

A ____

A ____

B. The glue that holds the organization together is commitment to innovation and development. There is an emphasis on being on the cutting edge.

B ____

B ____

C.The glue that holds the organization together is the emphasis on achievement and goal accomplishment. Aggressiveness and winning are common themes.

C ____

C ____

D.The glue that holds the organization together is formal
rules and policies. Maintaining a smooth-running organization is important.

D ____

D ____

100

100

NOW

PREFERRED

A. The organization emphasizes human development. High
trust, openness, and participation persist.

A ____

A ____

B. The organization emphasizes acquiring new resources
and creating new challenges. Trying new things and
prospecting for opportunities are valued.

B ____

B ____

C.The organization emphasizes competitive actions and
achievement. Hitting stretch targets and winning in the
marketplace are dominant.

C ____

C ____

D. The organization emphasizes permanence and stability.
Efficiency, control and smooth operations are important.

D ____

D ____

100

100

Total

5. STRATEGIC EMPHASES

Total
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6. CRITERIA OF SUCCESS
NOW

PREFERRED

A. The organization defines success on the basis of the development of human resources, teamwork, employee
employee commitment, and concern for people.

A ____

A ____

B. The organization defines success on the basis of having
the most unique or the newest products. It is a product
leader and innovator.

B ____

B ____

C.The organization defines success on the basis of winning
in the marketplace and outpacing the competition.
Competitive market leadership is key.

C ____

C ____

D.The organization defines success on the basis of efficiency. Dependable delivery, smooth scheduling, and low
cost production are critical.

D ____

D ____

100

100

Total

You have completed the OCAI, please continue with
the Management Skills Assessment
Instrument (MSAI)
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APPENDIX B
MANAGEMENT (LEADERSHIP) SKILLS
ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT (MSAI)
SELF-RATING FORM*
Describe your behavior as a manager/leader. Respond
to the items as you actually behave most of the time, not as
you would like to behave. If you are unsure of an answer,
make your best guess. Please circle your response in the following columns as appropriate. The following scale is used
for your ratings:
5 - Strongly Agree
4 - Moderately Agree
3 - Slightly Agree and/or Slightly Disagree
2 - Moderately Disagree
1 - Strongly Disagree
For Example:
1

Strongly Disagree

2

Moderately Disagree

3
Slightly Agree/Disagree

4

Moderately Agree

5

Strongly Agree

1. I communicate in a supportive way when people in my unit
share their problems with me.

1. I communicate in a supportive way when people in my unit
share their problems with me.

5

4

3

2

1

2. I encourage others in my unit to generate new ideas and
methods.

5

4

3

2

1

3. I motivate and energize others to do a better job.

5

4

3

2

1

4. I keep close track of how my unit is performing.

5

4

3

2

1

5. I regularly coach subordinates to improve their management skills so they can achieve higher levels of performance.

5

4

3

2

1

6. I insist on intense hard work and high productivity from my
subordinates.

5

4

3

2

1

* Reprinted with permission from Professor Kim Cameron.
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Strongly Agree

Moderately Agree

Slightly Agree/Disagree

Moderately Disagree

Strongly Disagree

7. I establish ambitious goals that challenge subordinates to
achieve performance levels above the standard.

5

4

3

2

1

8.I generate, or help others obtain, the resources necessary to
implement their innovative ideas.

5

4

3

2

1

9.When someone comes up with a new idea, I help sponsor
them to follow through on it.

5

4

3

2

1

10.I make certain that all employees are clear about our policies, values, and objectives.

5

4

3

2

1

11.I make certain that others have a clear picture of how their
job fits with others in the organization.

5

4

3

2

1

12. I build cohesive, committed teams of people.

5

4

3

2

1

13.I give my subordinates regular feedback about how I think
they’re doing.

5

4

3

2

1

14. I articulate a clear vision of what can be accomplished in
the future.

5

4

3

2

1

15. I foster a sense of competitiveness that helps members
of my work group perform at higher levels than members
of other units.

5

4

3

2

1

16. I assure that regular reports and assessments occur in
my unit.

5

4

3

2

1

17. I interpret and simplify complex information so that it
makes sense to others and can be shared throughout the
organization.

5

4

3

2

1

18. I facilitate effective information sharing and problem solving in my group.

5

4

3

2

1

19. I foster rational, systematic decision analysis in my unit
(e.g., logically analyzing component parts of problems) to
reduce the complexity of important issues.

5

4

3

2

1

21.I create an environment where involvement and participation in decisions are encouraged and rewarded.

5

4

3

2

1

22.In groups I lead, I make sure that sufficient attention is
given to both task accomplishment and to interpersonal
relationships.

5

4

3

2

1

23.When giving negative feedback to others, I foster their
self-improvement rather than defensiveness or anger.

5

4

3

2

1

24.I give others assignments and responsibilities that provide
opportunities for their personal growth and development.

5

4

3

2

1

25. I actively help prepare others to move up in the organization.

5

4

3

2

1

26. I regularly come up with new, creative ideas regarding
processes, products or procedures for my organization.

5

4

3

2

1
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Strongly Agree

Moderately Agree

Slightly Agree/Disagree

Moderately Disagree

Strongly Disagree

27. I constantly restate and reinforce my vision of the future to
members of my unit.

5

4

3

2

1

28. I help others visualize a new kind of future that includes
possibilities as well as probabilities.

5

4

3

2

1

29. I am always working to improve the processes we use to
achieve our desired output.

5

4

3

2

1

30. I push my unit to achieve world-class competitive performance in service and/or products.

5

4

3

2

1

31. By empowering others in my unit, I foster a motivational
climate that energizes everyone involved.

5

4

3

2

1

32. I have consistent and frequent personal contact with my
internal and my external customers.

5

4

3

2

1

33. I make sure that we assess how well we are meeting our
customers’ expectations.

5

4

3

2

1

34. I provide experiences for employees that help them become socialized and integrated into the culture of our
organization.

5

4

3

2

1

35. I increase the competitiveness of my unit by encouraging
others to provide services and/or products that surprise
and delight customers by exceeding their expectations.

5

4

3

2

1

36. I have established a control system that assures consistency in quality, service, cost, and productivity in my unit.

5

4

3

2

1

37. I coordinate regularly with managers in other units in my
organization.

5

4

3

2

1

38. I routinely share information across functional boundaries
in my organization to facilitate coordination.

5

4

3

2

1

39. I use a measurement system that consistently monitors
both work processes and outcomes.

5

4

3

2

1

40. I clarify for members of my unit exactly what is expected
of them.

5

4

3

2

1

41. I assure that everything we do is focused on better serving
our customers.

5

4

3

2

1

42. I facilitate a climate of aggressiveness and intensity in my
unit.

5

4

3

2

1

43. I constantly monitor the strengths and weaknesses of our
best competition and provide my unit with information on
how we measure up.

5

4

3

2

1

44. I facilitate a climate of continuous improvement in my unit.

5

4

3

2

1

45. I have developed a clear strategy for helping my unit successfully accomplish my vision of the future.

5

4

3

2

1
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Strongly Agree

Moderately Agree

Slightly Agree/Disagree

Moderately Disagree

Strongly Disagree

46. I capture the imagination and emotional commitment of
others when I talk about my vision of the future.

5

4

3

2

1

47. I facilitate a work environment where peers as well as subordinates learn from and help develop one another.

5

4

3

2

1

48. I listen openly and attentively to others who give me their
ideas, even when I disagree.

5

4

3

2

1

49. When leading a group, I ensure collaboration and positive
conflict resolution among group members.

5

4

3

2

1

50. I foster trust and openness by showing understanding
for the point of view of individuals who come to me with
problems or concerns.

5

4

3

2

1

51. I create an environment where experimentation and creativity are rewarded and recognized.

5

4

3

2

1

52. I encourage everyone in my unit to constantly improve and
update everything they do.

5

4

3

2

1

53. I encourage all employees to make small improvements
continuously in the way they do their jobs.

5

4

3

2

1

54. I make sure that my unit continually gathers information
on our customers’ needs and preferences.

5

4

3

2

1

55. I involve customers in my unit’s planning and evaluations.

5

4

3

2

1

56. I establish ceremonies and rewards in my unit that reinforce the values and culture of our organization.

5

4

3

2

1

57. I maintain a formal system for gathering and responding
to information that originates in other units outside my
own.

5

4

3

2

1

58. I initiate cross-functional teams or task forces that focus
on important organizational issues.

5

4

3

2

1

59. I help my employees strive for improvement in all aspects
of their lives, not just in job related activities.

5

4

3

2

1

60. I create a climate where individuals in my unit want to
achieve higher levels of performance than the competition.

5

4

3

2

1
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MANAGERIAL (LEADERSHIP) EFFECTIVENESS
SELF-RATING FORM
For questions 61-73, please rate your effectiveness in
performing these skills. Use the following scale in your rating:

Outstanding

Very Good

Average

Marginal

Poor

5 - Outstanding
4 - Very Good
3 - Average
2 - Marginal
1 - Poor

61. Managing teams (building effective, cohesive, smooth
functioning teams)

5

4

3

2

1

62. Managing interpersonal relationships (listening to and
providing supportive feedback to others)

5

4

3

2

1

63. Managing the development of others (helping others improve their performance and obtain personal development
opportunities)

5

4

3

2

1

64. Fostering innovation (encourage others to innovate and
generate new ideas)

5

4

3

2

1

65. Managing the future (communicating a clear vision of the
future and facilitating its accomplishment)

5

4

3

2

1

66. Managing continuous improvement (fostering an orientation toward continuous improvement among employees in
everything they do)

5

4

3

2

1

67. Managing competitiveness (fostering an aggressive orientation toward exceeding competitors’ performance)

5

4

3

2

1

68. Energizing employees (motivating others to put forth extra effort and to work aggressively)

5

4

3

2

1

69. Managing customer service (fostering a focus on service
and involvement with customers)

5

4

3

2

1

70. Managing acculturation (helping others become clear
about what is expected of them and about organizational
culture and standards)

5

4

3

2

1
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Outstanding

Very Good

Average

Marginal

Poor

71. Managing the control system (having measurement and
monitoring systems in place to keep close track of processes and performance)

5

4

3

2

1

72. Managing coordination (sharing information across functional boundaries and fostering coordination with other
units)

5

4

3

2

1

73. Overall management competency (general level of managerial ability)

5

4

3

2

1

74. On the basis of your level of management competency, how high in the organization do you expect to go in your career? (CHECK ONLY ONE ALTERNATIVE)
5________To the very top of the organization.
4________Near the top — just below the CEO.
3________To a senior position — e.g., a member of the executive
committee.
2________One level above where you are now.
1________No higher than the current position.
75. Compared to all other managers/leaders you’ve known, how would you rate
your own competency as a manager/leader of managers/leaders?
5________Top 5%
4________Top 10%
3________Top 25%
2________Top 50 %
1________In the bottom half
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IMPORTANCE INFORMATION
NOTE: The scale changes for question 76-87. Please read
carefully.
In order to succeed in your current position, how important is each of the following skills? Use the following scale in
your rating:

Critically Important

Very Important

Moderately Important

Of Some Importance

Little Importance

5 - Critically Important
4 - Very Important
3 - Moderately Important
2 - Of Some Importance
1 - Little Importance

76. Managing teams (building effective, cohesive, smooth
functioning teams)

5

4

3

2

1

77.Managing interpersonal relationships (listening to and
providing supportive feedback to others)

5

4

3

2

1

78. Managing the development of others (helping others improve their performance and obtain personal development
opportunities)

5

4

3

2

1

79. Fostering innovation (encourage others to innovate and
generate new ideas)

5

4

3

2

1

80. Managing the future (communicating a clear vision of the
future and facilitating its accomplishment)

5

4

3

2

1

81. Managing continuous improvement (fostering an orientation toward continuous improvement among employees in
everything they do)

5

4

3

2

1

82. Managing competitiveness (fostering an aggressive orientation toward exceeding competitors’ performance)

5

4

3

2

1

83. Energizing employees (motivating others to put forth extra effort and to work aggressively)

5

4

3

2

1
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Critically Important

Very Important

Moderately Important

Of Some Importance

Little Importance

84. Managing customer service (fostering a focus on service
and involvement with customers)

5

4

3

2

1

85. Managing acculturation (helping others become clear
about what is expected of them and about organizational
culture and standards)

5

4

3

2

1

86. Managing the control system (having measurement and
monitoring systems in place to keep close track of processes and performance)

5

4

3

2

1

87. Managing coordination (sharing information across functional boundaries and fostering coordination with other
units)

5

4

3

2

1
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DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
Please write the appropriate response in the space provided
next to the item number.
1. _____Sex

(1) Female
(2) Male

2._____Age (At Last Birthday)
(1) 30 & under		
(2) 31-35		
(3) 36-38		
(4) 39-41		

(5) 42-44
(6) 45-47
(7) 48-50
(8) over 50

3._____Rank (Current—Not Promotable to Rank)
(1) Colonel
(2) Lieutenant Colonel
4._____Branch (Not Functional Area) of the Army (Write in the 2 Letter Identifier, for example, “Infantry—IN”
5._____Source of Commission
(1) Military Academy
(2) ROTC
(3) OCS
(4) Direct Commission
(5) Other
6._____Ethnicity
(1) Caucasian
(2) African American
(3) Latino
(4) South Pacific Islander
(5) Asian
(6) Other
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7._____Component

(1) Active Army
(2) USAR
(3) USAR Title 10 and Title 32
(4) ARNG
(5) ARNG Title 10 and Title 32

8._____USAWC Class of
(1) 2003
(2) 2004
9._____Type of USAWC Student
(1) Resident
(2) Department of Distance Education
10._____Level of Education
(1) Bachelor’s Degree
(2) Master’s Degree
(3) Doctoral Degree
You have completed the MSAI, please return the survey by placing the completed
survey in a box labeled: “Completed OCAI/MSAI Surveys—COL Jim Pierce.” This
box will be located near the book return cart next to the student mailboxes on the
3rd floor of Root Hall.
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